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ARTICLES 
The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, 
and the Michigan Tribal-State Tax 
Agreements 
MATfHEWL.M. FLETCHER· 
. I 
II [TJ he power to tax involves the power to destroy. II 
liThe power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits. III 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 14, 2003, Rhode Island state police officers raided a 
smoke shop operated by the Narragansett Indian Tribe, seized the 
Tribe's unstamped cigarettes, and arrested about eight tribal 
• Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law, Director, 
Northern Plains Indian Law Center. Enrolled Member and former Staff Attorney, 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. Appellate Judge, Pokagon 
Band ofPotawatomi Indians. B.A. 1994, University of Michigan;].D. 1997, University 
of Michigan Law School. The opinions expressed in this essay are the Author's only 
and do not represent any position any Tribe may take or has taken, and may not be 
attributed to any Tribe. An earlier draft of this paper was presented in conjunction 
with the National Intertribal Tax Alliance's Fifth Annual Conference held August 20-
22, 2003. Chi-migwetch to Wenona Singel, Brian Upton, and John Petoskey, all of 
whom were members of Grand Traverse Band's negotiating team with me during the 
long, arduous tax agreement negotiations and were all kind enough to read prior 
drafts of this article. Brian and John worked on the negotiating team from the 
beginning. Wenona and I entered the picture in late 2001. Any factual assertions 
regarding the tax agreement negotiations are based on conversations I had with 
John, Brian, and Wenona, or are based on my own experiences. I wish also to thank 
our fellow lawyers - the long-suffering members of the tax agreement negotiation 
teams representing other Michigan tribes, particularly Kathryn Tierney, Bill Brooks, 
Mickey Parish, Rob Gips, Paul Shagen, Tony Mancilla,Jennifer Bliss, Chad DePetro, 
Jim Schoessler, Mike Phelan, Sean Reed, and Jim Bransky. I also thank Jonna 
Stebleton, an Interlochen, Michigan tax expert and a good friend who gave me 
insight on how tax preparers near Indian reservations view tax immunities. This 
piece is dedicated to Henry White, a Pokagon Band elder and leader, who 
contributed greatly to the tax agreement negotiations and who recently walked on 
into the next world. 
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,431 (1819). 
2. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex TeL Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) 
(Holmes,]., dissenting). 
HeinOnline -- 82 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 2 2004-2005
2 UNIVERSI1Y OF DETROIT MERCY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 82:1 
members.s Prior to the raid, Matthew Thomas, the Tribe's Chief 
Sachem, stated that if state police officers attempted to confiscate the 
unstamped cigarettes and shut down the smoke shop, "we'll throw 
them out.,,4 
The raid took place on. land owned by the Narragansett Tribe, 
and held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of the 
Tribe.5 The Tribe owned the smoke shop. The incidence of the state 
tax on cigarettes was on the retailer, which in this case was the Tribe.6 
The Supreme Court interpreted facts very similar to the Narragansett 
Tribe's situation in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation. 7 In 
Chickasaw Nation the Court held that" [i]f the legal incidence of an 
excise tax rests on a Tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside 
Indian Country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear 
congressional authorization.,,8 
The State of Rhode Island's position. is that the Rhode Island 
Indian Claims Settlement Act of 19789 grants the State the right to 
enforce its laws against the Tribe. The Settlement Act does state, "the 
settlement lands shall be subject to the civil and criminal laws and 
jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island."lo The First Circuit has held 
that the Act confers civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over 
the Tribe. 1I However, the First Circuit has also held that the 
Settlement Act does not operate to waive the sovereign immunity of 
the Narragansett Tribe. 12 As such, the State of Rhode Island has the 
authority to enforce its laws on the settlement lands, but it cannot do 
so by suing the Tribe. 
The State of Rhode Island's dilemma is encapsulated in 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of 
Oklahoma. IS In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that 
3. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and the Rhode Island 
Affiliate, the American Civil Liberties Union at 15-16, Narragansett Indian Tribe v. 
State of Rhode Island, 296 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. R.I. 2003). 
4. Id. 
5. State of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 689 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (finding that in September 1988, "the Tribe deeded the settlement lands 
to the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs as trustee"). 
6. Daniels Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Norberg, 355 A.2d 636, 638 (R.I. 1976). 
7. 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
8. Id. at 459. 
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716 (1978). 
10. Id. at §1708(a). 
11. State of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 695-96 (1st 
Cir. 1994). 
12. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, No.92-1622, 1993 WL 88161, at *1 
(1st Cir. Mar. 24, 1993); Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14, 15-16 
(1st Cir. 1993). 
13. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
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the State of Oklahoma was free to tax the tribal member retail sales to 
nonmembers. 14 However, the Court left the State of Oklahoma with 
what the State called "a right without any remedy" by also holding 
that the Indian Tribe's sovereign immunity precluded the State from 
enforcing its laws in court. IS The Court expressly stated that the State 
had several options for collecting its tax; it could "collect the sales tax 
from cigarette wholesalers[,] ... enter into agreements with the 
Tribes to adopt a mutually satisfactory regime... [,or] seek 
appropriate legislation from Congress. II 16 Rhode Island, like 
Oklahoma, was confronted with an Indian Tribe's sovereign 
immunity. 
Rather than take the Supreme Court's offer, and choose one or 
more of the several alternatives, the State of Rhode Island chose 
force. Perhaps an advisor to the governor or the attorney general 
read the Supreme Court's recent Indian law decisions, Inyo County, 
California v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop 
Colony,17 and Nevada v. Hicksl8 too literally. In Hicks, the Supreme 
Court held that where a state officer conducts an invalid search in 
Indian Country on property owned by a tribal member, that member 
may not sue in the court of his Tribe under Section 198319 to validate 
his federal rights.20 In Inyo County, the Court held that an Indian 
Tribe, victimized by an illegal search, may not sue a state government 
or its officers under Section 1983 to vindicate federal rights. 21 
Perhaps the advisor concluded that, if the Rhode Island state police 
were to raid the Narragansett smoke shop, the Tribe would have little 
or no remedy against the State and its officers in the event of a 
violent confrontation, which is exactly what happened. If so, this is 
truly a disturbing development that can be attributed, at least in part, 
to the Court's confusing and sometimes inarticulate decisions in 
Indian law cases. As Professor Robert N. Clinton noted, II [w]hat the 
Court is doing is creating a climate which gave the Rhode Island 
officials the belief that they could do what they did, which is not a 
14. Id. at 512 (citing Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 
463,483 (1976». 
15. Id. at 514. 
16. Id. 
17. 538 U.S. 701 (2003). 
18. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001). 
20. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65. 
21. Inyo County, 538 U.S. at 710. 
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healthy development. n22 In spite of these factors, the federal district 
court agreed with the State of Rhode Island.2s 
Rhode Island sits in stark contrast to its western neighbor, 
Connecticut, which recently negotiated tax agreements with the two 
federally recognized Indian Tribes located within its borders - the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation and the Mohegan Tribe.24 As 
Professor Clinton stated, n[b]oth states have ... great Indian leaders, 
both have tried to negotiate settlements. On one case, it has been 
highly successful. In another case, it has been a failure ofleadership 
on the State of Rhode Island's part. n25 
Over the years, many Tribes in many states have compacted with 
state governments to avoid disputes over taxation authority.26 
Voluntary agreement is by far the best method for Indian Tribes to 
settle a dispute with state governments. Tribes can no longer resort 
to the tomahawk,27 nor can Tribes expect success in federal courts.28 
22. Michael Corkery, Indians Say It May Be Fighting Time Again, PROVIDENCE (R.I.) 
J., Aug. 25, 2003 at AI, available at 2003 WI.. 57186504 (quoting Robert N. Clinton, 
law professor, Arizona State University Law School). 
23. Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Rhode Island, 296 F. Supp. 2d 
153, (D. R.I. 2003). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. See, e.g., Cooperative Agreement between the New Mexico Taxation and 
Revenue Department and Santa Clara Pueblo Tax Commission (jan. 29, 1998); 
Agreement between the Bay Mills Indian Community and the Michigan Department 
of Treasury (Apr. 9, 1997); Blackfeet Tribe - Montana Alcoholic Beverages Tax 
Agreement (May 24, 1995); Tax Agreement between the Minnesota Department of 
Revenue and the Lower Sioux Indian Community of Minnesota (Apr. 11, 1995); 
Agreement between the State of Minnesota and the White Earth Band of Chippewa 
Indians (Apr. 6, 1995); Tribal/State Tobacco Tax Compact between the Cherokee 
Nation and the State of Oklahoma (june 8, 1992); Tax Collection Agreement 
between the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Department of Revenue of the State 
of South Dakota (Feb. 25, 1991); Tax Collection Agreement between the 
Department of Revenue of the State of South Dakota and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
of the Rosebud Indian Reservation (Dec. 15, 1977); Tax Collection Agreement 
between the Department of Revenue of the State of South Dakota and the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation (june 17, 1976); 
Tax Collection Agreement between the Department of Revenue of the State of South 
Dakota and the Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation (Dec. 30, 
1970). 
27. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I, 18 (1831) ("At the time the 
constitution was framed, the idea of appealing to an American court of justice for an 
assertion of right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered the mind of an 
Indian or his Tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the government."). 
28. See David E. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of 
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1594 (1996) ("[Als tribal 
assertions of jurisdiction became more extensive, the Court started to retreat from its 
modern-era affirmations of unextinguished tribal powers, altering the margins of the 
Tribes' jurisdiction in order to preserve the values and interests of the larger 
HeinOnline -- 82 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 5 2004-2005
2004] THE MICHIGAN TRIBAL-STATE TAX AGREEMENTS 
I. HISTORY OF MICHIGAN TAX AGREEMENTS AND THE NEGOTIATIONS 
FOR A UNIFORM AGREEMENT 
5 
Fortunately, the recent experience for Michigan Indian Tribes so 
far has been more like Connecticut than Rhode Island. On 
December 20, 2002, seven of the twelve· federally recognized 
Michigan Indian Tribes agreed to sign a tax agreement 
{"Agreement"} with the State of Michigan. Those Tribes included 
the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, the Little River Band 
of Ottawa Indians, the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians of 
Michigan and Indiana, the Bay Mills Indian Community, the Sault 
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, the Nottawaseppi Huron Band 
of Potawatomi Indians, and the Hannahville Indian Community.29 
Other Michigan Indian Tribes that participated in the negotiations, 
society."); Katherine Collins, Water: Fear of Supreme Court Leads Tribes to Accept an 
Adverse Decision, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 19, 1992, reprinted in Harold Shepherd, 
Conflict Comes to Rnost! The Bureau of Reclamation and the Federal Indian Trust 
Responsibility, 31 ENVfL. L. 901, 904 n.16 (2001): 
In commenting on a determination by the Wind River Indian Reservation 
Tribes not to appeal an adverse decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court 
on water rights, Charles Wilkinson, [P]rofessor of Water Law at the 
University of Colorado, stated that the Tribes' case is "very compelling ... 
[and] supported by a century of Western Water Law. But this U.S. Supreme 
Court, with the recent appointments, is, in its own way, probably the most 
radical court we've had since the late nineteenth century - in terms of 
overturning and moving away from existing, settled principles." 
See also Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations 
from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 405 (2003); David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit 
of States' Rights, Colorblind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REv. 267 (2001); 
Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal 
Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1177 (2001). 
29. Tax Agreement Between the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians 
and the State of Michigan (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov / documents/LTBB_AgreemenC58762_7. pdf; Tax 
Agreement Between the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians and the State of 
Michigan (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov / documents/LTRB_AgreemenC5819-
l_with_appendix_88260_7.pdf; Tax Agreement Between the Pokagon Band of 
Potawatomi Indians of Michigan and the State of Michigan (Dec. 20, 2002), available 
at http://www.michigan.gov / documents/PokagonBandTaxAgreement_85485_7. pdf; 
Tax Agreement Between the Bay Mills Indian Community and the State of Michigan 
(Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov / documents/BayMillsFinaITaxAgreemenC61196_7 .pdf; 
Tax Agreement Between the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians and the 
State of Michigan (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov / documents/SaultSteFinalTaxAgreemenC61197 _7.pdf; 
Tax Agreement Between the Hannahville Indian Community and the State of 
Michigan (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov / documents/HannahvilleAgreemenC58669_7. pdf. These 
agreements are cited collectively hereinafter as the "Agreement." 
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but did not sign the agreement were: the Keweenaw Bay Indian 
Community, the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan, the 
Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, and the 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. The Match-
E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan did 
not participate in the negotiations. In 2004, the Grand Traverse 
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians agreed to participate in the 
tax agreement.30 
The Agreement negotiated between the Tribes and the State is a 
boilerplate agreement that describes exemptions, enforcement, 
administration, and termination. Each Tribe individually negotiated 
the agreement area with the State. 
Prior to the negotiations leading up to the current tax 
agreements, a few Michigan Indian Tribes signed agreements with 
the State. The Bay Mills Indian Community, for example, signed a 
relatively advantageous tax agreement on April 9, 1997, that the State 
unilaterally terminated. Other Tribes interested in a tax agreement, 
such as the Grand Traverse Band, sought to reach an agreement with 
the State on terms at least as favorable as the Bay Mills agreement. 
The State chose to start from scratch, and invited all of the Tribes to 
the table at once, to negotiate one uniform agreement in the late 
1990s. The stage was set up by the Executive Directive that 
recognized a "government-to-government relationship" with 
Michigan Tribes and the State.') 
The Michigan Indian Tribes met with each other to discuss a 
proposal to present to the State and vice versa. The Tribes and the 
State first met in 1997 to layout the parameters of a tax agreement, 
but did not begin serious, face-to-face negotiations until August 2001. 
The parties began to discuss common legal ground and areas of the 
law upon which they disagreed. Mter that stage, the parties engaged 
in the actual negotiating, or "horse trading," in which the State and 
the Tribes traded exemptions and legal strengths. 
30. Tax Agreement Between the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians and the State of Michigan (2004), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov / documents/GTBTaxAgreement_96417 _7.pdf. 
3l. See Executive Directive 2001-2, "Policy Statement on State-Tribal Affairs" 
(May 15, 2001), available at http://www.mich.gov; see also 2002 Government-to-
Government Accord between the State of Michigan and the Federally Recognized 
Indian Tribes in the State of Michigan (Oct. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/ Accordfinal534787.pdf (last visited on Aug. 5, 
2003). Executive Directive 2001-2 was based on the November 7, 2000 Executive 
Order on Indian Tribal Governments issued by President Clinton. See also Exec. 
Order No. 13,175 (2000). Former Governor Engler adopted this directive at the 
suggestion of John Petoskey, General Counsel for the Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. 
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A. Federal Indian Tax Law 
The Tribes and the State met together at first to discuss where 
they agreed on the law. This part of the article addresses the broad 
contours of federal Indian tax law as it related to the state taxes at 
issue in the negotiations. 
1. Tribes' Authority to Tax Indians and Nonmembers 
Indian Tribes retain the authority to impose taxes on both tribal 
members and nonmembers, with qualifications. The Supreme Court 
upheld the Tribes' inherent taxation authority in Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,32 Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe,33 and Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians.34 In 
Colville, the Court held, "[ t] he power to tax transactions occurring on 
trust lands and significantly involving a Tribe or its members is a 
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the Tribes retain unless 
divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their 
dependent status. "S5 In Merrion, the Court held that the taxation 
authority "derives from the Tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to 
control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost 
of providing governmental services."S6 A Tribe's ability to tax its own 
members is thus derived from its inherent authority as a sovereign 
entity. 
However, a Tribe's authority to tax nonmembers is limited. In 
the recent Supreme Court case Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley,s7 
the Court held that, absent congressional delegation of authority, a 
Tribe lacks inherent power to tax nonmembers unless it meets two 
exceptions, known as the Montana exceptions, S8 from Montana v. 
United States. S9 First, "[a] Tribe may regulate, through taxation, 
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the Tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.,,40 
Second, "[a] Tribe may ... exercise civil authority over the conduct 
of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
32. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
33. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
34. 471 U.S. 195 (1985). 
35. Colville, 447 U.S. at 152 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 
(1978)). 
36. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147. 
37. 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
38. fd. at 649-51. 
39. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
40. fd. at 565-66. 
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economic security, or the health or welfare of the Tribe."41 In 
Atkinson Trading, the Court determined that "Montana's consensual 
relationship exception requires that the tax or regulation imposed bX 
the Indian Tribe have a nexus to the consensual relationship itself." 2 
The Court determined that the second exception "grants Indian 
Tribes nothing beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations."43 The Supreme Court 
has never held that an Indian Tribe's taxation or regulation of a 
nonmember fits one of the two Montana exceptions.44 
In the recent cases Big Horn County Electric Cooperative. v. Adams45 
and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Assiniboine and Sioux 
Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation,46 the Ninth Circuit was on the 
forefront of determining whether a Tribe may tax nonmember-
owned businesses within the Tribe's reservation. In Big Horn, the 
court held that the Crow Tribe could not impose its utility tax on the 
utility cooperative doing business on a right-of-way created with the 
consent of the Tribe and the Department of Interior.47 The court 
rejected the Tribe's argument that the utility company had entered 
into a consensual relationship, invoking the first Montana exception.48 
The court agreed that the utility had entered into a consensual 
relationship with the Tribe, but held that the Tribe's tax was on the 
property of the utility - not the activities - and therefore was outside 
the scope of the first exception.49 The Crow Tribe attempted to 
invoke the second exception by arguing that it required the tax 
revenue to "finance important tribal services and [the revenue was], 
therefore, essential to the continued well-being of the Tribe."50 The 
court rejected the argument, and held that any Tribe tax would fit 
the exception under the Tribe's theory and "effectively swallow 
Montana's main rule."51 The court expressly overruled an earlier case, 
Burlington Northern Railroad. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian 
41. Id. at 566. 
42. Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. at 656. 
43. Id. at 658-59 (quoting A-I Contractors v. Strate, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997)). 
44. Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court's "Whack-A-Mole" Game Theory in Federal 
Indian Law, A Theory That Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7 GREAT 
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES]' 90, 97 (2002). 
45. 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000). 
46. 323 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Burlington Northern /1]. 
47. Big Hom, 219 F.3d at 950. 
48. Id. at 951. 
49. Id. ("An ad valorem tax on the value of Big Horn's utility property is not a 
tax on the activities of a nonmember, but is instead a tax on the value of property 
owned by a nonmember, a tax that is not included within Montana's first 
exception. "). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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Reservation,52 in which the court upheld the Blackfeet Tribe's ad 
valorum tax on nonmember-owned property. 58 
In Burlington Northern II, the Ninth Circuit revisited tribal taxes 
imposed on the Burlington Northern railroad company; in this case, 
the ad valorum tax of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort 
Peck Reservation.54 The court dispensed with the Tribes' attempt to 
invoke the first Montana exception, comparing the Tribes' tax to the 
Crow Tribe's tax in Big Hom.5 The Tribes made a showing that over 
1,600 freight cars cross the reservation every day, hazardous materials 
are carried on the railroad, and there have been numerous fires and 
accidents with attendant fatalities.56 Consequently, the court held 
that the Tribes had "shown some basis for believing that [Burlington 
Northern's] use of its right-of-way threatens serious harm to the 
Reservation .... ,,57 The court remanded the case to the district court 
to allow the Tribes to conduct discovery on the second Montana 
• 58 
exceptlon. 
However, the Montana rule has sharply curtailed the authority of 
Tribes to tax nonmembers. Because of the stringency of the Montana 
test, several courts have invalidated tribal taxes imposed on 
nonmembers and nonmember-owned businesses.59 
Because Indian Tribes do not have a property tax base, they are 
forced to use creative forms of economic development in order to 
finance basic governmental services for their members.60 To date, the 
52. 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Burlington Northern 1]. 
53. Big Hom, 219 F.3d. at 954. 
54. Burlington Northern II, 323 F.3d 767, 768-69 (9th Cir. 2003). 
55. Id. at 772. 
56. Id. at 774. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 774-75. Other courts have also remanded for a factual determination 
of whether the second exception applies, but the remands did not result in 
published opinions. See Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort 
Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994) (remanding case to determine if 
Tribes' real property tax on nonmember property within the reservation met the 
second Montana exception). 
59. See Reservation Telephone Coop. v. Henry, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (D. N.D. 
2003) (invalidating Fort Berthold Tribes' possessory interest tax on phone company 
property located on rights-of-way located on the reservation); In re Haines, 245 B.R. 
401 (D. Mont. 2000) (holding that Crow Tribe could not collect sales tax owed by 
nonmember hotel and restaurant located on nonmember-owned fee land within the 
reservation boundaries during bankruptcy proceeding). But c/, Yellowstone County 
v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Crow Tribal Court had no 
jurisdiction to enjoin county property tax on fee land owned by Tribal Member 
within the reservation). 
60. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 1314 (D. D.C. 1987) 
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predominant economic development engines for Indian Tribes have 
been gaming, natural resource development, and retail sales of 
tobacco products. As tribal revenues in these areas have increased, 
state governments and nonmembers have attempted to preclude 
tribal revenue from being collected.6l 
2. State Authority to Tax Indian Tribes 
It is not an overbroad generalization to state that states may not 
tax Indian Tribes. They simply may not. The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that states do not have the authority to tax Indian 
Tribes or their land since the 19th centuIJ.62 More recently in 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,6 the Court held that if 
the legal incidence of a state tax falls on the Indian Tribe, the state 
tax is preempted by federal law. 64 The Court originally articulated the 
federal preemption doctrine, as applied to state laws that affect 
Indians and Indian Tribes, in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission,65 and then later in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker.66 
The ability of a state to enforce its tax laws against Indian Tribes 
even in circumstances where the state tax is not preempted by federal 
law is circumscribed by tribal sovereign immunity. In Oklahoma Tax 
Commissioner v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,67 the 
Court held that, where the legal incidence of the state tax fell on 
nonmembers, the Tribe was obligated to collect that tax and remit 
("[T]he Indians have no viable tax base and a weak economic 
infrastructure. Therefore they, even more than the states, need to develop 
creative ways to generate revenue."). 
6l. Corkery, supra note 22, available at 2003 WL 57186504 
("The non-Indians will never give up," said Rick Jemison, the chief of staff to the 
president of the Seneca Nation in upstate New York, which is battling with that state 
for the right to sell tax-free cigarettes. "They always want what they don't have. They 
have proven that time and time again."). 
62. The Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866); The N.Y. Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866). 
63. 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
64. [d. at 459 ("IT the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a Tribe ... ,the tax 
cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization."); see also Prairie Band 
Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1307 (D. Kan. 2003) ("It is 
settled law that a state tax is unenforceable if the legal incidence of the tax falls on an 
Indian Tribe .... ") (citing Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458); Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. 
Hammond, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1269 (D. Idaho 2002); Baraga Products, Inc. v. 
Comm'r of Revenue, 971 F. Supp. 294,297 (W.D. Mich. 1997), affd, No. 97-1449, 
1998 WL 49674 (6th Cir.July 23,1998). 
65. 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965). 
66. 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) ("The exercise of [state] authority may be 
preempted by federal law.") (citing Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. 685; 
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973». 
67. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
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the money to the State.68 However, the Tribe's immunity precluded 
the State's ability to bring suit against the Tribe to enforce the 
collection.69 In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 
Inc./o the Court solidified the rule when it upheld the sovereign 
immunity, both on and off the reservation, of Indian Tribes,7l 
whether the Tribe acted in a governmental manner or in a 
commercial manner. 72 Finally, state and federal courts consistently 
hold that corporations and other legal entities of the Tribe are also 
immune from suit.7! It stands to reason that no matter where an 
68. Id. at 512-13 (citing Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 
U.S. 463, 482-83 (1976». 
69. Id. at 513-14. 
70. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
71. Id. at 754 (holding that its cases "have sustained tribal immunity· from suit 
without drawing a distinction based on where the tribal activities occurred") (citing 
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 167 (1977». See also 
Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998); Sac 
and Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (lOth Cir. 1995); In re Greene, 980 
F.2d 590, 593-97 (9th Cir. 1992); Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 
1065 (1st Cir. 1979);John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 758-59 (Alaska 1999); Thompson v. 
Crow Tribe of Indians, 962 P.2d 577, 581 (Mont. 1998); Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 
N.W.2d 284, 295 (Minn. 1996); Morgan v. Colo. River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 
(Ariz. 1968). 
72. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754-55 (citing Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 167; 
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 
(1991); and United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 
(1940»; Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000); Sac 
and Fox Nation, 47 F.3d at 1064-65; Multimedia Games, Inc. v. WLGC Acquisition 
Corp., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1135 (N.D. Okla. 2001); Redding Rancheria v. Super. 
Ct., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384, 388 (2001); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Houghtaling, 589 
So.2d 1030,1032 (Fla. App. 1991». Seegenerally Md. Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank 
of West Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1966) (it is in commercial activities 
where Indian Tribes need the most protection). 
73. Barker v. Menominee Nation Casino, 897 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. Wis. 
1995) ("[An] action against a tribal enterprise is, in essence, an action against the 
Tribe itself.") (quoting Local IV-302 Int'l Woodworkers Union of Am. v. Menominee 
Tribal Enter., 595 F. Supp. 859, 862 (E.D. Wis. 1984». See, e.g. Huron Potawatomi, 
Inc. v. Stinger, 574 N.W.2d 706 (1997) (citing Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 
509; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Mich. United 
Conservation Clubs v. Anthony, 280 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979». See also 
Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 
(lst Cir. 2000) (housing authority); Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. ColI., 205 
F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000) (Tribally-chartered community college); Duke v. 
Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Okla. Hous. Auth., 199 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(housing authority created through state statute); Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe 
Hous. Auth., 144 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1998) (housing authority); EEOC v. Fond 
du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993) (Tribally 
owned construction company); Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 
809-10 (7th Cir. 1993) (wholly-owned Tribal corporation); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. 
Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1986) (Tribal housing 
authority); In re Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 
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Indian Tribe operates, no matter what type of activity that Tribe is 
engaged in, and even if that Tribe is operating through a separate 
entity, the state may not enforce its tax against the Tribe. 
There is one Supreme Court case which states that a state may 
tax an Indian Tribe's operations if it operates outside of Indian 
Coun try. 74 In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. jones,75 the Mescalero Apache 
Tribe established an off-reservation ski resort on land leased by the 
Tribe from the federal government in accordance with the Indian 
Reorganization Act.76 The case arose when the State of New Mexico 
attempted to impose a use tax on the materials used to construct the 
resort and a sales tax on the resort's gross receipts." The Court noted 
in a broad generalization, "[a]bsent express federal law to the 
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have 
generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise 
applicable to all citizens of the State.,,78 The Court held that the 
State's sales tax could be applied to the Tribe's resort,79 but that the 
use tax could not be applied to materials affixed to the real estate 
owned by the federal government.80 
jones is likely no longer good law. The Supreme Court in Kiowa 
Tribe swept aside the broad generalization made in jones about off-
reservation activities by expressly stating, "[ t] 0 date, our cases have 
sustained tribal immunity from suit without drawing a distinction 
based on where the tribal activities occurred. ,,81 More damning for 
jones, the Court in Kiowa Tribe listed the Mescalero Apache Tribe's ski 
resort as an off-reservation commercial activity owned by an Indian 
Tribe that retained the Tribe's immunity from suit.82 jones is a 
remnant of an older, outdated view of Indian law. The Supreme 
Court had not yet articulated the significance of the legal incidence 
989, 993 (N.Y. 1995) (non-profit, state-chartered corporation). But cf Baraga 
Products, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 971 F. Supp. 294, 296-97 (W.D. Mich. 1997) 
(" [A] corporation may be entitled to the protections of an Indian Tribe if it is acting 
as the Tribe's agent.") (citing Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. State ex rel Okla. Tax 
Comm'n, 768 P.2d 359 (Okla. 1988». 
74. "Indian Country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2001). Although § 1151 is 
a criminal statute, the definition is used for civil purposes as well. See DeCoteau v. 
Dist. County Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 427, n.2 (1975). 
75. 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
76. [d. at 146. 
77. [d. at 146-47. 
78. [d. at 148-49. Preceding this general statement, the Court stated, 
"[g]eneralizations on this subject have become particularly treacherous." [d. 
79. [d. at 157-58. 
80. [d. at 158-59. 
81. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). 
82. [d. at 758. 
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of state taXes,ss nor had it articulated the federal preemption doctrine 
as it applies to Indian Tribes.s4 The Tenth Circuit has declined to 
view Jones as authority for the general proposition that a state may tax 
an Indian Tribe operating outside oflndian Country.S5 
Though property taxes are outside the scope of the Michigan 
Tribal-State Tax Agreements and thus outside the scope of this 
article, it should be understood that states most likely may tax the real 
property of Indian Tribes that are not held in trust by the federal 
government. In County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
Yakima Indian Nation,s6 the Court held that a state's tax foreclosure of 
land owned by Indian Tribes is not considered a suit against the 
Tribe, but instead an in rem proceeding against the property.S7 As 
such, in Cass County, Minnesota v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa 
Indians,88 the Court held that where tribal land has been previously 
alienated by Congress under the General Allotment Act,89 the State 
may impose a tax upon it.90 However, dle Second Circuit recentlx 
held in Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. City of Sherill, New York, 1 
that where a Tribe purchases land within its reservation and Congress 
never changed the status of the land, that is, where Congress never 
authorized the alienation of the reservation land, that land is not 
taxable by the state.92 
3. State Authority to Tax Indians 
Where a tribal member resides in Indian Country, the state does 
not have taxing authority over that member. First, a state's ability to 
impose income taxes on Indians is limited. The Supreme Court held 
83. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482 (1976). 
84. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). 
85. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1255 (10th Cir. 
2001) (citing Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 249 F.3d 1l01, 1112 (9th 
Cir.2004) (Browning,J., dissenting) ("[Since] the decision on White Mountain Apache 
v. Bracker in 1980, the Court has continued to reiterate the more flexible analysis 
used in that case, without any particular emphasis on it applying only in situations 
occurring on reservations;" and "[e]ven the Court in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones 
recognized that the off-reservation application of non-<iiscriminatory state law was 
only a generality and not calVed in stone on Mt. Sinai."». 
86. 502 U.S. 251 (1992). 
87. [d. at 264-65. (emphasis added). 
88. 524 U.S. 103 (1998). 
89. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 358, 381 (2000). See generaUy 
FEux S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 612-32 (Rennard Strickland, et 
aI., eds., 1982). 
90. Cass County, 524 U.S. at 113 (citing County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 263; Goudy 
v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146,149 (1906». 
91. 337 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2904 (2004). 
92. [d. at 156-57. 
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in McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona9S that states have no 
authority to tax the reservation income of tribal members.94 In 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation,95 the Court held that 
the tribal member may also be domiciled within Indian Country but 
not necessarily a reservation in order to enjoy the tax exemption.96 
However, Indians that live within another Tribe's Indian Country may 
be subject to state taxation.97 Moreover, Indians living within their 
own Indian Country but whose income is derived off-reservation may 
be subject to state taxes. Finally, the Court held in Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation98 that states may tax the income of 
tribal members domiciled outside of Indian Coun~, even if that 
income is derived entirely from within Indian Country. 9 
States may not impose tax on personal property, such as motor 
vehicles, owned by tribal members domiciled in Indian Country and 
property housed or garaged in Indian Country. In Moe v. Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 100 Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,IOI and Sac and Fox,102 
the Court held that the state does not have authority to impose its 
motor vehicle tax and registration on Indians living in Indian 
Country. In Moe, the Court applied the federal preemption test to 
invalidate a Montana tax on personal property owned by Indians 
living on their own reservation. lOS In Colville and in Sac and Fox, 
Washington and Oklahoma imposed taxes on personal property 
owned by tribal members living in Indian Country, but tried to avoid 
93. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
94. Id. at 165 ("The [state income tax] is therefore unlawful as applied to 
reseIVation Indians with income derived wholly from reservation sources."). 
95. 508 U.S. 114 (1993). 
96. Id. at 124-25. 
97 .. LaRock v. Wis. Dept. of Revenue, 606 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Wis. 1999) (citing 
McClanahan, 411 U.S. 145, 165; Anderson v. Wis. Dept. of Revenue, 484 N.W.2d 914, 
922 (Wis. 1992». 
98. 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
99. Id. at 462-67. 
100. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
101. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
102. 508 U.S. 114 (1993). 
103. Moe, 425 U.S. at 480-81 
(The personal property tax on personal property located within the 
reservation; the vendor license fee sought to be applied to a reseIVation 
Indian conducting a cigarette business for the Tribe on reseIVation land; 
and the cigarette sales tax, as applied to on-reservation sales by Indians to 
Indians, conflict with the congressional statutes which provide the basis for 
decision with respect to such impositions.). 
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the prohibition in Moe by labeling the taxes "excise taxes.,,104 The 
Court saw through the ruse and invalidated the taxes. 105 
4. State Authority to Tax Nonmembers in Indian Country 
Since there is no general bar to a state's authority to tax 
nonmembers in Indian Country, the question of whether a state has 
the authority is subject to the federal preemption test, first stated in 
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission. 106 The Court 
in Colville articulated the general rule of the preemption test as 
follows: 
While the Tribes have an interest in raising revenues for 
essential governmental services, that interest is strongest 
when the revenues are derived from value generated on the 
reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the 
taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. The State also has 
a legitimate interest in raising revenues, and that interest is 
strongest when directed at off-reservation value and when 
the taxpayer is the recipient of state services. 107 
As such, Indians and Indian Tribes acting as retailers are 
required to collect and remit state sales tax for purchases made by 
nonmembers in Indian Country. Applying the preemption test, the 
Supreme Court in Deeartment oj Taxation and Finance oj New York v. 
Milhelm Attea & Bros., 08 and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe oj OklahomalO9 held that the states' interests in 
104. Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 127-28. 
105. Id. 
(Oklahoma's taxes are no different than those in Moe and Colville. Like the 
taxes in both those cases, the excise tax and registration fee are imposed in 
addition to a sales tax; the two taxes are assessed for use both on and off 
Indian Country; and the registration fees are imposed annually based on a 
percentage of the value of the vehicle. Oklahoma may not avoid our 
precedent by avoiding the name "personal property tax" here any more 
than Washington could in Colville.). 
See also Colville, 447 U.S. at 163. 
(The only difference between the taxes now before us and the one struck 
down in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and imposed for the 
privilege of using the vehicle in the State, while the Montana tax [in Moe] 
was labeled a personal property tax .... We do not think Moe and 
McClanahan can be this easily circumvented. While Washington may well be 
free to levy a tax on the use outside the reservation of Indian-owned 
vehicles, it may not under that rubric accomplish what Moe held was 
prohibited.) . 
106. 380 U.S. 685 (1965). 
107. Colville, 447 U.S. at 156-57. 
108. 512 U.S. 61 (1994). 
109. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
HeinOnline -- 82 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 16 2004-2005
16 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 82:1 
collecting tax revenue from nonmembers outweighed the Tribes' 
sovereignty interests,1l0 or the Tribes' interests in "offering a tax 
exemption to customers who would ordinarily shop elsewhere. "III 
However, where the tax implicates value generated on the 
reservation, the state tax is preempted. In Colville, the Court held 
that a state tax is preempted where the tax is imposed directly on 
"value flenerated on the reservation by activities involving the 
Tribes." 2 The Colville Court relied on McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission,1I5 where the Court found that Arizona could not tax 
tribal members' income where that income derived from the 
reservation. 114 Thus, courts will invalidate a state tax on mcome 
generated on a reservation or within Indian Country. 115 
110. Milhelm Attea, 512 U.S. at 73-74; Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 512-13 
(citing Colville, 447 U.S. 134; Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 
U.S. 463 (1976». 
111. MilhelmAttea, 512 U.S. at 73. 
112. Colville, 447 U.S. at 156-57. 
113. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
114. Id. at 165. 
115. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045-
46 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that state tax on Tribal hotel sales to nonmembers is 
preempted) (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 
(1987»; Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657,659-60 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that state tax on timber produced on-reservation by nonmember company is 
preempted); Indian Country U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex reI. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 829 
F.2d 967, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that state tax on Creek Nation's high-
stakes bingo enterprise invalid because "high-stakes bingo is not generally available 
within the state") (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 155, 157); Crow Tribe of Indians v. 
Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In this case, the revenues sought to 
be taxed by Montana may ultimately be traced to the Tribe's mineral resources, a 
component of the reservation land itself. This is not a case where the Tribe is simply 
marketing a tax exemption, as where Tribes seek to sell tax-free cigarettes to non-
Indians."); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225-26 (D. 
Ran. 2002) (granting temporary restraining order against state enforcement of 
motor fuel tax on fuel value generated in Indian Country), affd, 341 F.3d 1202 (10th 
Cir. 2003); Flat Center Farms, Inc. v. State Dept. of Revenue, 49 P.3d 578, 581-82 
(Mont. 2002) (holding that state corporation license tax was inapplicable to Indian-
owned corporation doing business on reservation because "the value the State wishes 
to tax is generated entirely in a sovereign state"), em. denied, 537 U.S. 1046 (2002). 
But cJ. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 341-42 (1983) 
(invalidating state regulation of Tribal hunting and fishing activities, in part, because 
all revenue generated from activities was on the reservation); In re Blue Lake Forest 
Products, Inc., 30 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that Tribe's interest in 
debtor's proceeds in bankruptcy from timber sales outweighed other creditors 
because value was generated on the reservation); Prairie Band ofPotawatomi Indians 
v. Richards, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1194 (D. Ran. 2003) (holding that state's motor 
vehicle registration requirements were preempted by Band's competing 
requirements) . 
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B. Interests oj the Michigan Indian Tribes 
The Michigan Indian Tribes were motivated to meet with the 
State because the State began to charge sales and use tax on 
construction contractors doing business on reservation and trust 
land. The contractors, of course, passed the cost onto the Tribes. 
From the Tribes' points of view, the State's action to collect the tax 
from the contractors off the reservation was illegal. Moreover, by 
collecting the tax from the contractors, the State appeared to be 
challenging the Tribes to litigate or at least force negotiations. Many 
of the Michigan Tribes have plans to engage in economic 
development and government construction and this was a "big-ticket" 
item. The attorney for Little Traverse Bay Bands calculated that the 
State had collected hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Band's 
construction of its administration buildings on trust land, pure 
sovereign governmental functions that the State should not have 
been able to tax. ll6 The same was true for most Tribes, including the 
Grand Traverse Band. 
The Tribes also generally wished to avoid litigating tax 
exemptions in the federal courts, which have not been receptive to 
tribal sovereignty as opposed to states' rights, particularly the 
Supreme Court. More importantly, neither the State nor the Tribes 
wished to litigate reservation boundaries at this time. Unlike most 
Tribes in the western United States, the boundaries of Michigan 
Tribes' reservations are not judicially defined,117 with the exception of 
the Keweenaw Bay Indian Communi~'s reservation. llS The State had 
threatened to seek disestablishmentll or diminishmene20 of Michigan 
reservations in the event of litigation to establish taxation 
116. See Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue ofN.M. 458 U.S. 
832,838 (1982); Mescalero Apache Tribe v.Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148, 155-56 (1973). 
See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (holding that, absent express 
Congressional acts to the contrary, states may not exercise jurisdiction if it would 
interfere with "the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled 
by them"). 
117. John F. Petoskey, Doing Business With Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 MICH. B. J. 
440,445 (1997) 
(The exterior boundaries of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, the Bay Mills Indian Community, the Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, the Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa 
Indians and the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians have not been subject 
to "exterior boundaries" litigation. . .. Presumably, the boundaries still 
exist as defined in the original treaties.). 
118. Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan, 784 F. Supp. 418 (W.D. Mich. 
1991). 
119. DeCoteau v. Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975) (holding that Lake 
Traverse reservation was disestablished). 
120. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 341 (1998) (holding 
that ceded lands did not retain reservation status). 
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exemptions. Further, the cost of the litigation, especially the cost of 
expert witnesses required to testify on the reservation boundaries,121 
was a deterrent to litigation. 
As a general matter, all the Tribes agreed that taxes on tobacco, 
motor fuel, affixations to real estate, rental rooms, utilities, any 
purchases made by Indians living in Indian Country, and income of 
Indians living in Indian Country were invalid. 
C. The State of Michigan's Interest 
The State's stated motivation to negotiate with the Michigan 
Tribes stemmed mostly from its inability to collect valid taxes from 
non-tribal members in Indian Country. The State was concerned 
about Tribal and Tribal-member businesses exploiting tax 
exemptions to garner a competitive advantage over non-Indian 
businesses, or "marketing the exemption." Many tribal members on 
several reservations had establ,ished businesses such as smoke shops 
for the express purpose of marketing the exemption. Apparently, the 
State's efforts to enforce state taxes on these businesses had not 
deterred others from starting up their own. Tribal governments had 
not assisted the State in its enforcement actions. 
The State had many of the same concerns about litigating tax 
exemptions as the Tribes. First, the State did not want to lose a tax 
exemption case as they had in United States on behalf of the Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Michigan,122 or a reservation boundary case as 
they had in Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Michigan. 123 Secondly, 
and more importantly to the State, litigation costs would overwhelm 
the ultimate revenues collected. 
Near the end of the negotiations, the State generated a list of 
"talking points" to the State Legislature that listed the following as 
justification for the adoption of the authorizing legislation in 
December 2002: 124 (1) the Tribes would "dictate" the terms of 
litigation because the Tribes have sovereign immunity; (2) state taxes 
currently go uncollected; (3) Tribal retailers enjoy competitive 
advantages and the State needs to "level the playing field;" (4) the 
State cannot enforce state law; (5) the Tribes purchase out-of-state to 
avoid state taxes; (6) the Tribes use old exemption certificates to 
receive sales tax exemptions on auto purchases for the Tribes and 
121. United States v. Michigan. 471 F, Supp. 192. 204 (W.D. Mich. 1979) ("The 
Court heard extensive historical evidence and received voluminous documentation 
meant to provide a basis for interpreting the often ambiguous treaties in issue in this 
case."). 
122. 106 F.3d 130 (6th Cir. 1997). 
123. 784 F. Supp. 418 (W.D. Mich. 1991). 
124. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 205.3(c) (West 2004). 
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tribal members; (7) tribal members and Tribes sell "vast quantities" of 
untaxed cigarettes to nonmembers; (8) Tribes register autos and 
some consumer goods for tribal members in order to avoid state 
taxes; and (9) Tribes will commence operating tax free outlet malls 
and auto dealerships. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Summary of the Tax Agreement 
The Tax Agreement between the Michigan Indian Tribes and 
the State of Michigan is complex and difficult to understand. The tax 
exemptions for the Tribes and tribal members sometimes disappear 
once one leaves a certain parcel of land, and reappear once one 
crosses a particular section line into an obscure toWnship. Tax 
exemptions may also disappear if one brings an item across one of 
the imaginary lines, government boundaries such as section lines and 
h · 125 towns ipS. 
Few of the lines and boundaries affecting the exemptions 
contained in the agreement have any relationship whatsoever to 
reservation boundaries or Indian Country. The enforcement 
mechanisms, though strongly supporting tribal court and tribal 
police jurisdiction, are riddled with difficult time frames and 
notification procedures. The dispute resolution mechanism to 
handle problems between the Tribes and the State involves 
multifaceted forms of binding arbitration in which the most difficult 
problems may be selecting an acceptable panel of arbitrators. 
However, the Agreement provides a level of certainty to state 
taxation questions in Indian Country in Michigan that was sorely 
lacking. The fact that most Michigan Tribes' reservation boundaries 
are either unknown or unrecognized by the State creates unique 
problems for Michigan Indian Country. This uncertainty has been 
detrimental to tribal governmental and business activities. Moreover, 
applying the federal preemption test is a risky proposition at best: 
[Supreme Court] litigation has produced considerable 
confusion, largely as a result of apparent inconsistencies in 
the decisions applying [the balancing] test. Tribes, states, 
and potential investors cannot predict the outcome of the 
125. It is interesting that, during negotiations, state negotiators brought forth 
maps with different township and section lines, lines that are sometimes much 
different than is commonly available or in use in the modem age. The negotiators 
referred to these lines as "surveyed" lines, ostensibly referring to the original 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 surveys probably done in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. As such, when tribal negotiators discussed section and township lines 
prior to negotiations, they did not have the same materials as the state negotiators. 
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test as applied to a particular fact situation. Thus, neither 
the Tribe nor a potential investor can know for certain in 
advance whether proposed business activity will be subject to 
one or two taxes. If the proposed venture goes forward, it 
will bear a risk of double taxation that its off-reservation 
competitors do not face. 
This confusion obviously discourages reservation economic 
activity and ultimately works to the disadvantage of all 
• 126 partIes. 
However, the State recognized tribal court decisions are valid in 
Michigan state courts in accordance with Michigan Court Rule 2.615, 
which provides a procedure to enforce Tribal Court judgments in 
State Courts. 127 The court rule, developed in the mid-1990s/28 
provided an additional basis for the agreement. 
126. Petoskey, supra note 117, at 445-46. 
127. MICH. CT. R. 2.615 states as follows: 
(A) The judgments, decrees, orders, warrants, subpoenas, records, and 
other judicial acts of a tribal court of a federally recognized Indian Tribe 
are recognized, and have the same effect and are subject to the same 
procedures, defenses, and proceedings as judgments, decrees, orders, 
warrants, subpoenas, records, and other judicial acts of any court of record 
in this state, subject to the provisions of this rule. 
(B) The recognition described in subrule (A) applies only if the Tribe or 
tribal court(l) enacts an ordinance, court rule, or other binding measure 
that obligates the tribal court to enforce the judgments, decrees, orders, 
warrants, subpoenas, records, and judicial acts of the courts of this state, 
and 
(2) transmits the ordinance, court rule or other measure to the State Court 
Administrative Office. The State Court Administrative Office shall make 
available to state courts the material received pursuant to paragraph (B) (1). 
(C) Ajudgment, decree, order, warrant, subpoena, record, or other judicial 
act of a tribal court of a federally recognized Indian Tribe that has taken 
the actions described in sub rule (B) is presumed to be valid. To overcome 
that presumption, an objecting party must demonstrate that 
(1) the tribal court lacked personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, or 
(2) the judgment, decree, order, warrant, subpoena, record, or other 
judicial act of the tribal court 
(a) was obtained by fraud, duress, or coercion, 
(b) was obtained without fair notice or a fair hearing, 
(c) is repugnant to the public policy of the State of Michigan, or 
(d) is not final under the laws and procedures of the tribal court. 
(D) This rule does not apply to judgments or orders that federal law 
requires be given full faith and credit. 
See also Grand Traverse Band Court Rule, Chapter 10 (Rules Regarding Enforcement 
and Recognition of Foreign Judgments). 
128. Hon. Michael F. Cavanaugh, Michigan IS Story: State and Tribal Courts Try to Do 
the Right Thing. 76 U. DET. MERCVL. REv. 709, 713-14 (1999). 
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1. Terms of Art Created for the Agreement 
a. The Agreement Area 
The "agreement area"l29 concept developed over the course of 
the negotiations in order to smooth over many of the difficulties 
created by the lack of a clearly designated Indian CountrylSO for most 
Michigan Indian Tribes. The parties generally agreed that the State 
had no authority to enforce its tax laws on tribal members in Indian 
Country. lSI Moreover, since the agreement area would define the 
geographic scope of many of the tax exemptions, its creation as a 
concept allowed the parties to extend or retract certain tax 
exemptions depending on how the negotiations developed. 
Each Tribe negotiated individually with the State over its 
agreement area and, naturally, several problems developed. Each 
Tribe generally started from the position that its service arealS2 should 
be its agreement area. Grand Traverse Band, for example, has a six-
county service area, much larger than its reservation boundaries but 
representative of its traditional core territory. The Tribal Council 
agreed to allow the State to negotiate the size of the agreement area 
down from a service area dream to a reservation boundaries goal. 
However, the State was unwilling to even discuss a service area-sized 
agreement area and unwilling to include provisions that implied the 
existence of extant reservation boundaries. Grand Traverse Band 
eventually negotiated an agreement area that approximated the total 
area of both its reservations combined but did not mirror the 
boundaries of the reservations. 
The State's position was to limit the agreement area to trust 
lands and some tribally-owned fee land, as it had been prior to the 
commencement of the negotiations. This position was in line with 
the belief that many of the Tribes had regarding the State; that for 
129. Agreement § II(A). 
130. "Indian Country" was defined in accordance with the 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
(2000) definition during the negotiations. 
131. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958) (holding that the states may not 
interfere with the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be 
governed by them); White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Ramah 
Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue ofN.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982). 
132. The development of the "service area" concept began after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), in which the Court held that 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs could not define a Congressional entitlement for 
Indians "on or near the reservation" as "on the reservation." The "service area" 
concept then bled into tribal constitutions. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians Constitution, Art. I, § 2 (defining "Service Area"), available at 
http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/GTBcons3.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2003). (The 
Grand Traverse Band's service area encompasses Leelanau, Grand Traverse, Antrim, 
Charlevoix, Benzie, and Manistee Counties.). 
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the State, the agreement area would be a huge factor in limiting the 
growth of Michigan Indian Tribes. In essence, the Tribes believed 
the State wanted to keep the Tribes where they were both 
geographically and economically. During the course of the 
negotiations, it appeared to many tribal negotiators that the State had 
come to the table on behalf of non-Indian businesses, almost like a 
trade union would negotiate on behalf of its constituents. The state 
negotiators often took positions that were more driven by politics 
than revenue enhancement and tax enforcement. The Tribes had 
come to the table to preserve what tax exemptions they felt should 
have been available from the beginning, which the State had cut off 
with one method or another. For the Tribes, tribal economic 
development and growth was a strong priority and would help the 
State economically, as gaming had done. Yet it appeared to some 
tribal negotiators that the State had come to the table to stop tribal 
economic growth in its tracks. 
Since the State's original position on the agreement area was 
completely untenable to all but a few Tribes, the State ultimately 
conceded the point to an extent. However, the agreement area 
concept that would have broadly defined tax exemptions became 
splintered into six separate versions. The larger agreement area 
agreed to by the State included between two-and-a-half and ten 
townships. The three Ottawa Tribes each negotiated for about six 
townships each. This agreement area had the most relevance to 
tribal members. 
b. Tribal and Trust Lands (TTL) 
The remaining five forms of agreement area became known as 
tribal and trust Lands, or TTL. 133 Each of these five was a list of 
133. Agreement § II(K): 
(1) all lands held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of the 
Tribe which are listed on Appendix A (K-l) and designated as Tribal and 
Trust Lands at the time this Agreement is executed, 
(2) all fee lands owned by the Tribe which are listed on Appendix A (K-2) 
and designated as Tribal and Trust Lands at the time this Agreement is 
executed, 
(3) all Tribal lands acquired after execution of this Agreement within an 
area identified for automatic Tribal and Trust Land status on Appendix A 
(K-3) so long as they are used for a Governmental Function, 
(4) all Tribal lands accepted into federal trust after execution of this 
Agreement which are located [within or outside] the area identified in 
Appendix A (K-4) [those areas within the Agreement Area where lands 
accepted into trust are or are not automatically afforded Tribal and Trust 
Land status], regardless of the use of such Tribal lands, and 
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parcels owned by the Tribe either in fee or in trust that would be 
included in various appendices to the agreement. 
The first was a list of trust lands that would be included in all of 
the tax exemptions. l !14 These parcels would have the full advantages 
of the Agreement, in accordance with federal law. 135 Trust lands 
excluded from the list would not have the full advantages of the 
Agreement. State law would control on these parcelS. 136 Of course, 
several Tribes strongly objected to any agreement that would allow 
the State to impose its laws on trust land, and several refused to sign 
it, in part, because of this provision. The State refused, at least in the 
experience of the Grand Traverse Band, to allow trust land used for 
non-gaming economic development near urban centers such as 
Traverse City to be listed in this provision. 
The second form of TTL would grant TTL status to the fee 
parcels listed in the appropriate appendix.137 Here, the State generally 
agreed to include all non-economic development parcels away from 
urban centers in this category. Since activity on fee lands owned by 
the Tribes may be subject to state taxation,138 this allowance by the 
State was a small victory for the Tribes. However, again the State 
limited the benefit to lands used solely for governmental purposes 
that were away from urban centers. The state negotiators listed 
hotels, resorts, industrial parks, and manufacturing facilities as 
(5) all other lands acquired after execution of this Agreement by the Tribe 
that are mutually agreed upon in writing by the parties to this Agreement 
and identified in Appendix A (K-5). 
134. Agreement § II(K)(I). 
135. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000) ("[S]uch lands or rights shall be exempt from State 
and local taxation."). Seee.g, Williams, 358 U.S. 217; The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 
(1866); Connecticut ex reL Blumenthal v. United States Dept. ofInterior, 228 F.3d 82, 
85 (2d Cir. 2000). 
136. Agreement § I (A) (2) ("Except as modified in this Agreement, the provisions 
of State law relating to the taxes that are subject of this Agreement shall apply to the 
Tribe, Tribal Members, and Tribal Entities."); see also, Agreement § I(A) (1): 
While this Agreement is in effect between the Tribe and the State it is 
agreed that (i) their respective rights will be determined by this Agreement 
with respect to the taxes that are the subject of this Agreement, (ii) neither 
party will seek additional entitlement or seek to deny entitlement on any 
federal ground (including federal preemption) whether statutorily 
provided for or otherwise with respect to the taxes that are the subject of 
this Agreement .... 
137. Agreement § II(K) (2). 
138. In 1997, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the State of Michigan could not assess 
property taxes on land owned by Michigan Indian Tribes in fee simple. See United 
States on behalf of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Michigan, 106 F.3d 130 
(6th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court vacated that decision in 1998 in light of its 
decision in Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 
(1998). See Michigan v. United States, 524 U.S. 923 (1998). 
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examples of tribal economic development activities the State desired 
to curb. 
The third form of TTL would grant TTL status to after-acquired 
trust land parcels anywhere within designated bounds inside of the 
agreement area if used for governmental purposes. JSg This was known 
as "automatic TTL." The Tribes raised the problem of after-acquired 
trust parcels that mayor may not move straight to the first category of 
TTL parcels. The Tribes took the position that trust land is trust 
land, either acquired before or after the Agreement's inception. The 
State countered by arguing, somewhat disingenuously, that it had 
would have no choice but to begin opposing tribal applications to 
take land into trust. Currently, Indian Tribes are having extreme 
difficulty completing the 25 C.F.R. Part 151 fee-ta-trust acquisition 
processJ40 because of political issues within the Department of 
Interior. J4J With that express threat clouding the discussion, Tribes 
that were more motivated to sign the agreement had no choice but to 
accept the State's position. Other Tribes did not. 
The State argued during negotiations over particular parcels to 
be included in this list that it intended to protect non-Indian 
businesses from tribal and tribal member businesses who may use the 
agreement to "market the exemption.,,142 Championing non-Indian 
businesses, the state negotiators refused to agree to TTL status for 
any after-acquired trust land near urban centers and other businesses. 
139. Agreement § II(K)(3). 
140. 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10-151.11. 
141. Letter from Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, to Cyrus Schindler, 
President, Seneca Nation of Indians 3 (Nov. 12, 2002) (''While I do not intend to 
signal an absolute bar on off-reservation gaming, I am extremely concerned that the 
principles underlying the enactment of IGRA are being stretched in ways Congress 
never imagined when enacting IGRA."); Press Release, Rep. Roy Blunt, House 
Leadership Call for Halt to Off-Reseroation Indian Gaming: Branson & Kansas City Sites 
Need Protection from Indian Casino Expansion (July 25, 2003), available at 
http:www.blunt.house.gov (last visited July 30, 2003) (citing Letter from Rep. J. 
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, Rep. Tom DeLay, House Majority Leader, 
Rep. Roy Blunt, House Majority Whip, and Rep. Eric Cantor, House Chief Deputy 
Whip, to Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior (July 12, 2003» 
(If the Department of Interior permits Indian Tribes to establish a 
reservation, take lands into trust and build a casino with little or no present 
or historical connection, the Department of Interior will effectively sanction 
reservation shopping. This would establish a dangerous precedent whereby 
Tribes could, and would, locate casinos in any state where gaming is 
allowed.); 
Rick Aim, Republicans Want Tribal Casino Sites Restricted, K.C. STAR,July 22,2003; Mark 
Simon, Indian Casinos Facing Scrutiny: Feinstein Wants to Rein In Projects, S.F. CHRON., 
July 21, 2003. 
142. See Dep't. of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 
72 (1994) (quoting Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980». 
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The State negotiated, in effect, to defeat the very purposes of putting 
land into trust - freedom from state taxation. Several Tribes balked 
at this insistence and may have refused to execute the agreement for 
this reason. 
During negotiations with Grand Traverse Band, the State created 
yet another form of TTL within this provision by negotiating for a 
limitation on the areas within the band's six-county service area in 
which the State would allow after-acquired land to automatically 
become TTL if used solely for governmental purposes. Since the 
State refused to acknowledge an agreement area that included the 
entire service area, the band negotiated for twenty-two to twenty-four 
townships throughout the service area, some outside the agreement 
area, that the band might develop infrastructure to provide direct 
services to tribal members such as housing, health care, or other 
social services. 
The fourth form of TTL came to be known as the "economic 
development zone" or, the "economic development buffer zone." 
Here, the State agreed to categorize after-acquired trust land as TTL 
for purposes of all tax exemptions within an area inside the 
agreement area but outside of "buffer zones" protecting urban areas 
within the agreement area.14S The State's earlier position was that all 
after-acquired trust land to be used for economic development 
purposes would be negotiable after the inception of the Agreement. 
In essence, the State could exercise a veto under the Agreement over 
any trust land to be used for economic development. The Tribes 
were not willing to concede this power to the State, especially since 
with federal fee-to-trust regulations unsettledl44 and the current 
national political thinking in regards to trust acquisitions, the State 
already had that power. The parties compromised by creating the 
"buffer zones." 
The flfth form of TTL was a catchall provision allowing the State 
and the Tribes to negotiate for any other after-ac~uired lands, fee or 
trust, to be included within the TTL designation. 14 
143. Agreement § II(K)(4). 
144. A substantial effort had been made by the Clinton administration to 
establish clear guidelines regarding off-reservation acquisitions. See Acquisition of 
Title to Land in Trust, Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 3452, 3455 (Jan. 16,2001) 
(We will accept title to land in trust outside a reservation or outside an 
approved TLAA only if the application shows that the acquisition is 
necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, 
Indian housing, land consolidation or natural resource protection and that 
meaningful benefits to the Tribe outweigh any demonstrable harm to the 
local community.). 
However, the Bush Administration withdrew these rules on November 9, 2001. 
145. Agreement § II(K)(5). 
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2. Tax Exemptions and Revenue Sharing 
The State and the Tribes negotiated over exemptions from six 
state taxesl46 - sales and use taxes, motor fuel taxes, tobacco taxes, 
income taxes, and the Michigan Single Business Tax - for both 
Indian tribal governments and individual Indians. Other taxes, such 
as property taxes, which in Michigan are within the province of local 
governments,147 and real estate transfer taxes were not included in the 
negotiations and subsequently not dealt with in the Agreement. 
Since several Michigan Indian Tribes have adopted their own 
sales tax codes and rely upon the revenues to provide direct services 
to tribal members/48 the Tribes also negotiated for a sales tax revenue 
sharing scheme. 
3. Pre-Effective Date Requirements 
Prior to the effective date of the Agreement, and prior to 
December 15 of each year, each Tribe must submit to the State a 
current list of members and their addresses living in the agreement 
area,149 a list of all tribal and tribal member-owned businesses in the 
agreement area/50 and a list of all lands purchased by the Tribe or 
taken into trust for the Tribe.15I The tribal attorney must also "certify 
that the Tribe has taken all necessary steps to bind Tribal Members 
and Tribal Entities to the terms of this Agreement.,,152 
146. Agreement§ I(B). 
147. MICH. COMPo LAwsANN. § 211.1 (West 2003). 
148. See, e.g., 4 Grand Traverse Band Code § 407 ("Sales Tax on Restaurant and 
Lodge"), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/gtcode/travcode4budget.htm 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2003); Bay Mills Indian Community Ordinance Establishing a 
Tribal Use Tax on Persons Purchasing Accommodations on the Reservation of the 
Bay Mills Indian Community, available at 
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/baymillscode/bmusetax.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 
2003); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians Tribal Code §§ 43.201, ("Gross 
Receipts Tax"), available at 
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/saultcode/ssmcode43tax.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 
2003). 
149. Agreement § XIII(B)(1). 
150. Agreement § XIII(B)(2). 
151. Agreement § XIII(C). 
152. Agreement § XIX(B). 
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B. Taxes Involved in the Tax Agreement 
1. Sales and Use Taxes 
a. Exemptions Jor Tribal Government 
The Agreement provides a tax exemption to the Tribe or a 
Tribe-owned business entity for all purchases of tangible personal 
proper\¥ if the items are used exclusively within Tribal or Trust 
Lands.1 
The Agreement also provides a tax exemption to the Tribe for 
purchases made within the broader agreement area for tangible 
personal property that will be primarily used for "Tribal 
Governmental Functions.,,154 There is no restriction on where the 
property is used, unlike the previous provision. 
There is a specific provision allowing for the exemption from 
taxes for affixations to real estate on Tribal and Trust Lands. 155 This 
provision allows the Tribes to construct administrative facilities, 
housing and other infrastructure projects, and economic 
development projects on trust land without the State imposing a tax 
on the materials used in their construction on the contractors, who 
would then pass it on to the Tribes. This provision alone likely saves 
each Michigan Indian Tribe signatory hundreds of thousands of 
dollars a year in construction costs. Of course, the Tribes argued 
vehemendy that the State should have no power whatsoever to tax 
activity on trust lands. This provision ensures that the State cannot 
take an end-run around Tribal sovereignty to pad its treasury by 
pinching a Tribe's construction contractors, as is the current practice 
in Michigan. 
"Tribal Governmental Functions" is a term of art that includes 
functions derived from the list provided in the Agreement. 15S "The 
one area that clearly is not subject to taxation by the federal or state 
government is when the Tribe is acting in its sovereign capacity, such 
as the current gaming operations on Indian reservations.,,157 During 
153. Agreement § III (A) (l)(a). 
154. Agreement § III(A)(I) (b). 
155. Agreement § III (A) (3) (a). 
156. Agreement §§ I1I(A)(I)(b)(i)-(ix). Presumably, the term is analogous to 
the Internal Revenue Code's term, "essential governmental functions." See 26 U.S.C. § 
7871 (e) ("For purposes of this section, the term 'essential governmental function' 
shall not include any function which is not customarily performed by State and local 
governments with general taxing powers."). 
157. Petoskey, supra note 117, at 446; see also, Multimedia Games, Inc. v. WLGC 
Acquisition Corp., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1135 (N.D. Okla. 2001); Redding Rancheria 
v. Super. Ct., 88 Cal. App. 4th 384, 388 (2001). But cf. Md. Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat'l 
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negotiations, the Tribes resisted including a distinction between 
governmental functions and economic development functions,158 but 
the State insisted on creating the distinction for certain taxes. 
Importantly, "actual gaming activities" is a function included in 
the list of governmental functions. 159 The inclusion of gaming 
activities was an acknowledgement by the State that the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Ad60 would likely preclude any attempt by the 
State to tax gaming activities, because of the federal preemption 
doctrine and the strong federal regulatory presence in Indian 
gaming. lSI It appears redundant because, under federal law, Class III 
gaming must be conducted on trust landsl62 or on reservation lands,16s 
but it avoids the end-run tax problem created by the State. 
Bank of West Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that it is in 
commercial activities where Indian Tribes need the most protection). 
158. Distinguishing between the economic development and governmental 
functions of an Indian Tribe is dangerous for the Tribes. Issues relating to the 
applicability of tribal sovereign immunity, application of labor and employment laws 
of general applicability; and the survival of Indian preference have been framed in 
this light. See, e.g., Baraga Prod., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 971 F. Supp. 294, 296 
(W.O. Mich. 1997) ("[AJ corporation has been held to be entitled to the same 
sovereign immunity as the Indian Tribe when it is organized under tribal laws; it is 
controlled by the Tribe; and it is operated/or government purposes.") (emphasis added); 
Flynt v. Cal. Gaming Control Comm'n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002) ('We believe that Judge Kozinski's provocative dicta [in Williams v. Babbitt, 
115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997»), when considered in context, can be best understood 
as casting constitutional doubt on Indian-run gaming monopolies formed solely for 
business purposes untethered to any declared federal objective of strengthening 
tribal self-government or promoting the Tribe's economic development."); Dixon v. 
Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1109-11 (Ariz. 1989) (holding a tribally-created 
corporation did not enjoy immunity because it was a simple business venture, having 
no responsibility for promoting tribal welfare or development); Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 34, Inyo County, California v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop 
Cmty of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003) ("[IJf what was formerly tribal 
government has now been so infused with a commercial character, that it seems to 
me calls tribal immunity into question generally."). 
159. Agreement § III (A) (1) (b) (viii). 
160. 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721 (2000). 
161. See Casino Res. Corp. v. Harrah's Entm't, Inc., 243 F.3d 435, 437-39 (8th Cir. 
2001); State ex reL Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1108-09 (8th Cir. 
1999); Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 548-50 (8th Cir. 
1996); Sungold Gaming (U.S.A.) Inc. v. United Nation of Ottawa, Chippewa, and 
Potawatomi Indians of Michigan, Inc., 1999 WL 33237035, at *2-4 (W.O. Mich.June 
7,1999); Am. Vantage Cos. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 103 Cal. App. 4"' 590, 595-
96 (2002). 
162. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (B) (2000) (defining "Indian lands" to include all trust 
lands). 
163. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a)(l) (noting that Class III gaming may be conducted on 
any lands located within reservation boundaries); § 2703(4)(A) (defining "Indian 
lands" to include "all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation"). 
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Vehicles used primarily for tribal gaming activities within 25 
miles of a casino are exempt from state sales and use taxes.164 
"Primarily" is defined as 95 percent or more. The Little Traverse Bay 
Bands attorney requested the usage of the word "primarily" in this 
section because, on occasion, tribal gaming shuttles may be used to 
transport elders and other tribal members to and from tribal services 
outside the agreement area. Absent this provision, tribal vehicles 
intended for use in gaming activities, such as transporting garners to 
and from a tribal casino, could be subjected to state use tax if they 
make their way outside the agreement area. 
State taxes are inapplicable to rental rooms located within one-
quarter mile of tribal gaming facility if the facility is located on tribal 
and trust lands. l65 Moreover, they are not subject to the revenue 
sharing described in more detail below. Restaurant food and 
beverage sales are exempt if located at a tribal gaming facility and on 
tribal and trust lands.166 
Also, the tax exemptions apply in the event a Tribe or its entities 
enter into a business relationship with another Tribe that is a 
signatory to the agreement.167 Hopefully, these provisions will allow 
Tribes, as tribal governments, to avoid some of the difficulties 
inherent in owning non-gaming businesses. l68 
b. Sales Tax Revenue Sharing 
For the Michigan Indian Tribes that adopt a sales tax code and 
agree to collect the tax from all tribal and tribal-member entities 
doing business within their jurisdiction, the State agreed to 
incorporate a revenue sharing provision in the Agreement. 169 The 
revenue sharing scheme takes into account the State's interest in 
collecting taxes owed to it under state law by non-members and also 
the Tribes' interests in preserving their revenues as much as possible. 
164. Agreement § III(A)(l)(d). 
165. Agreement § III (A) (5). 
166. Agreement § III (A) (6). 
167. Agreement § III (A) (1) (c). 
168. Robert L. Gips, Current Trends in Tribal Economic Development, 37 NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 517, 519 (2003): 
Similar to other governments that run businesses, Tribes must address 
political interference with business decision-making and micromanagement 
by tribal governing bodies. The governmental need for funds often means 
that the surplus created by a profitable tribal business is stripped off for 
distribution to members or governmental programs rather than reinvested, 
as would happen in other businesses. Additionally, governmental employee 
work and incentive structures are often not the same as those required in a 
competitive business. Finally, governmental decision-making timetables are 
often much slower and more protracted than the business world tolerates. 
169. Agreement §§ III(B), XII(D). 
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A tribal sales tax remains optional for the Tribes. This means that if 
they do not adopt their own sales tax code that mirrors the State's 
code, all taxes collected by the Tribes must be remitted to the State 
along with information as to the purchases made by tribal 
members. 170 Then the State will refund the tax revenue collected by 
the Tribe. The Tribe may then distribute the revenue back to the 
tribal members (or it may have already fronted the members the sales 
tax) or keep the money in the tribal treasury. 
Mter a Tribe adopts a sales tax code that mirrors the State's, the 
Tribe may engage in revenue sharing.171 Revenue sharing applies 
only to purchases made within tribal and trust lands. 172 The sharing is 
as follows: for the first $5,000,000, one-third of the tax collected must 
be remitted to the state. 175 For the annual gross receipts exceeding 
$5,000,000, the Tribe and the State split the revenues fifty_fIfty.174 If 
the Tribe does not wish to enact a sales tax code, then it must still 
share the revenue with the State in the same proportions. 175 
The State will apply the state sales and use tax on all retailers 
outside of tribal and trust lands.176 Revenue sharing does not apply to 
these transactions. Revenue sharing also does not apply to rental 
rooms within one-quarter mile of an Indian casino.177 
The revenue sharing provisions were intended by the parties to 
preserve revenues for each side as much as possible. In other states 
such as Minnesota, Nebraska, and Washington, Tribes and states had 
adopted tax agreements with widely varying percentages of splits that 
the parties took into consideration. 
c. Exemptions for Tribal Members 
The Tribes entered into negotiations arguing that the State 
could not impose taxes on the personal property of tribal members in 
Indian Country, relying upon Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes. 178 The State agreed, but continued to argue that Indian 
Country in Michigan is limited to trust land and land owned by the 
Tribe in fee simple. 
The fIrst exemption for tribal members is the exemption from 
state sales and use taxes for any purchases of tangible personal 
170. Agreement § XII(D) (2). 
171. Agreement § III (8) (3). 
172. Agreement §§ III (8) (3), XII(D) (2). 
173. Agreement§ III (8) (3)(a). 
174. Agreement § 1II(8)(3)(b). 
175. Agreement § III (8) (2). 
176. Agreement § III(C) (1). 
177. Agreement§III(A)(5). 
178. 425 U.S. 463 (1975); see also Okla. Tax Common v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 
U.S. 114 (1993). 
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property on land owned in trust or by the Tribe in fee simple.179 
There are no restrictions on the kinds of use the tribal member may 
have for the products, except that it must be used exclusively within 
tribal or trust lands. This provision allows tribal members to operate 
a business on tribal or trust lands and purchase materials for the 
business tax-free. The Tribes fought hard for this provision that, 
although limited in scope to tribal and trust lands, gave some 
economic development benefits to tribal members. 
The second exemption and likely the most important politically 
for tribal leaders is the sales and tax exemption on products 
purchased for personal use for tribal members residing within the 
agreement area. ISO Tribal members can make purchases anywhere 
within the agreement area and expect that those purchases would be 
made tax-free. The administration of this exemption creates one of 
the more difficult problems faced by both the Tribes and the State. 
The parties created two schemes to solve the problem, allowing each 
Tribal Council to choose a method. The first scheme involves tribal 
certificates of exemption. The second method involves a refund 
formula to be distributed at the same time as income tax refunds. lSI 
A third exemption, also very important for the tribal leaders 
politically, is the exemption for sales of automobiles, recreational 
watercraft, snowmobiles, and off-road vehicles. ls2 Tribal members 
residing within the agreement area may purchase these items tax-
free. Virtually every tribal attorney in Michigan has dealt with the 
State on behalf of a tribal member living within the reservation 
boundaries attempting to purchase a car or truck tax-free. Since the 
tax on a $10,000 car is $600, the amount for each tribal member is 
significant. Though Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nationls3 
indicates that the State may not tax vehicles purchased and garaged 
in Indian Country, the State has haphazardly clamped down on tax-
free vehicles sales depending on its perception of the status of a 
Tribe's reservation boundaries. The State also often delayed 
refunding sales tax for several months. 
Another big-ticket item for tribal members, the fourth 
exemption, was on state taxes on mobile and modular homes. ls4 This 
exemption applies to tribal members living within the agreement 
area if the tribal member could prove that the home in question was 
the primary residence. 
179. Agreement § III (A) (2) (a). 
180. Agreement § III (A) (2)(b). 
181. [d. 
182. Agreement § III (A) (2) (c). 
183. 508 U.S. 114 (1993). 
184. Agreement § III (A) (2) (d). 
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A fIfth exemption for tribal members is the exemption from state 
taxes on home construction, renovation, or improvement for primary 
residences. 185 This provision allows tribal members to construct 
homes, much of which may be financed with federal or tribal dollars, 
within the larger agreement area. For tribal members engaged in 
home construction or renovation, the exemption may be worth 
thousands of dollars. 
A sixth exemption applies to personal property purchased for 
treaty fIshing purposes.186 As with Indian gaming, treaty fIshing is an 
area of law that the State implicitly conceded was completely 
preempted by federal law through the recognition by federal courts 
of the treaty fIshing rights preserved in the various treaties signed by 
the Michigan Indian Tribes. 18' The exemption applies for 
commercial treaty fIshing anywhere the property is purchased or 
used. l88 The exemption applies for all other treaty fIshing if the 
property is purchased within the agreement area.189 
The exemptions for tribal members in this section apply 
regardless of whether the personal property is jointly titled to a non-
member spouse. 190 
d. Certificates of Exemption or Refund Method 
Once the Agreement is effective, each Tribe has the option of 
choosing to utilize certifIcates of exemption or the refund method to 
take advantage of the sales and use tax exemptions for most 
purchases. 191 The Agreement authorizes the Tribes to show the 
certifIcate, along with a letter of authorization from the State 
(because there is no such thing as redundant paperwork), to vendors 
for personal property purchases, treafJ; fIshing materials purchases, 
and construction materials purchases. I 2 The refund method simply 
allows the Tribes to seek reimbursement for sales and use taxes 
collected by vendors from the State.193 
The Tribes specillcally negotiated for the option of using 
exemption certillcates because of past history with the State. Several 
Tribes, including the Grand Traverse Band, had been attempting the 
refund method all along for purchases of materials on trust land, but 
185. Agreement § III(A) (3) (b). 
186. Agreement § III (A) (4). 
187. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979). 
188. Agreement § III(A) (4) (b). 
189. Agreement § III (A) (4) (a). 
190. Agreement § III(A)(2)(e). 
191. Agreement § XII(B). 
192. Agreement § XII(B)(I)(b). 
193. Agreement § XII (B)(2). 
HeinOnline -- 82 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 33 2004-2005
2004] THE MICHIGAN TRIBAL-STATE TAX AGREEMENTS 33 
the Treasury Department bureaucrats were slow to approve the 
refunds - sometimes months behind - and often disapproved refunds 
for litde or no reason. The State, on the other hand, argued that 
some Tribes and tribal members had abused letters of exemption 
authorized by the Tribes and negotiated for a pure refund system. As 
part of the agreement, the State promised to provide refunds within 
the 45-day state law period mandated to process refund requests or 
incur interest costs. 
The Tribe also has the option of allowing tribal members to 
utilize the refund or certificate method. 194 The State agreed to the 
use of certificates for tribal members only because the Tribes agreed 
to be liable for abuses by tribal members, sgecifically, use of the 
certificate after termination of the Agreement. 1 5 
Because the certificates may be floating around after the 
termination of the Agreement, the State insisted on a waiver of 
sovereign immunity from the Tribes that did not expire upon 
. . f h A 196 termmatIon 0 t e greement. 
2. Tobacco and Motor Fuel Taxes 
The State acknowledged during negotIatIons that it had no 
authority to tax tribal member purchases of tobacco products and 
motor fuels, as long as the purchases were made on trust land, and if 
the Tribal member also lived in Indian Country where the legal 
incidence of the tax fell on the purchaser. 197 However, the State 
believed that it had authority to impose a tax on all non-tribal 
members and non-Indians in accordance with Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reseroation. 198 
The tax exemption and administration provisions for the 
tobacco and motor fuel taxes are parallel to each other. In both 
instances, each indiYidual Tribe must select one of two options for 
administration of the tax exemption - either the "refund method" or 
the "quota method."I99 Under both methods, each Tribe must 
identify to the State which retailers may sell tax-free tobacco 
products2°O or motor fuels. 201 
Under the quota method, each individual Tribe and the State 
negotiate for a cap or quota on the amount of tobacco products or 
194. Agreement § XII(C) (1). 
195. Agreement § XII(F)(2). 
196. Agreement § I(G)(l)(c). 
197. Okla. Tax Comm'n. v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
198. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
199. Agreement §§ V(A), VI(A). 
200. Agreement §§ VI(B) (2), VI(C) (4). 
201. Agreement §§ V(B) (2), V(C) (4). 
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motor fuels the Tribe may purchase tax-free for a period of time.202 
Also, each Tribe may purchase these products from only one pre-
identified wholesaler.20s Under the refund method, the Tribes would 
prepay state taxes on motor fuels and tobacco products and request a 
refund from the State.204 
However, ther\! is little practical difference between the quota 
method and the refund method - they both require the State to 
negotiate with each Tribe to determine a cap.205 The State's position 
regarding the amount of product the Tribes could sell should be 
limited to sales only to tribal members living in the agreement area. 
Several Tribes had established a relationship with its membership 
living off-reservation to come to the tribal retailer to purchase tax-
free tobacco products and motor fuels and were unwilling to sever 
that relationship. Politically, it would be difficult for tribal leaders to 
restrict the sales to resident tribal members because other tribal 
members had an expectation of being able to enjoy tax-free 
purchases. Moreover, the Tribes wanted to be able to provide a tax 
exemption to both the Tribes and tribal member businesses. The 
State harshly balked at the Tribes' proposals in this regard, arguing 
that Tribes should not be allowed to "market the exemption." 
Ultimately, the State refused to back down and negotiated caps for 
each Tribe that reflected the Tribe's actual usage. A few Tribes, such 
as Bay Mills and Grand Traverse Band, had a history of seeking 
refunds from the State and therefore had a history of expected usage 
patterns. Other Tribes calculated their expected usage based on 
these figures. As for sales to tribal members residing outside the 
agreement area, the State allowed the Tribes to choose the quota 
method and decide through its allocation of quota how to distribute 
the benefit. 
3. Individual Income Tax 
As a general matter, the State has no authority to tax the 
reservation income of tribal members living on the reservation.206 
However, since most Michigan Indian Tribes do not have clear 
reservation boundaries, it has not been conclusively litigated whether 
202. Agreement §§ V(C) (1) (motor fuels), Vl(C) (1) (tobacco products). 
203. Agreement §§ V(C) (2) (motor fuels), Vl(C) (2) (tobacco products). 
204. Agreement §§ V(B)(I) and (7) (motor fuels), V(B)(I) and (7) (tobacco 
products). 
205. Agreement §§ V(B) (3) and (C)(I) (motor fuels), VI(B)(3) and (C) (1) 
(tobacco products). 
206. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Lac du 
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Zeuske, 145 F. Supp. 2d 969 
(W.D. Wis. 2000); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 
(1987). 
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the State has authority to tax the income of tribal members living 
within the reservation boundaries reserved by the relevant treaty but 
not on trust land. Some Tribes have adamantly defended the rights 
of their members to maintain the exemption from state income tax. 
However, the State has hinted that it may pursue a reservation 
boundaries case in order to resolve the question. Since neither the 
States nor the Tribes wished to press the issue, both sides readily 
agreed to the provision in the Agreement on income tax. 
The Agreement exempts all non-business and business income 
for tribal members living within the agreement area from state 
income taxes. 207 Treaty fishing income is also excluded from state 
income taxes insofar as it is exempted from federal income 
taxation.208 
The State agreed to broadly expand the exemption from state 
income taxes as a main feature of its determination to enter into the 
Agreement. The State's concession was surprising for two reasons. 
First, since reservation boundaries were not settled for most Tribes, 
the State had previously argued that all tribal members not living on 
trust land were not in a Tribe's Indian Country. Second, the 
agreement area for most Tribes extended, in some places, far beyond 
the areas where even the Tribes believed reservation boundaries 
extended. For example, the Grand Traverse Band and the State 
tentatively agreed to include Grand Traverse County, which includes 
Traverse City and several hundred tribal members in the agreement 
area, even though Traverse City is not within the reservation 
boundaries in either Grand Traverse Band's 1836209 or 1855210 treaty 
reservations. 
207. Agreement §§ IV(A) and (B). 
208. Agreement § IV(C). 
209. The portions of the Grand Traverse Reservation established by the 1836 
Treaty of Washington ultimately included Old Mission Peninsula and portions of 
Acme Township in Grand Traverse County, Michigan. See e.g., Report of Dr. James 
M. McClurken at 30-49; Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. 
United States Attny. for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 2002) 
(describing how the federal government delayed the creation of the 1836 reservation 
and forced the Grand Traverse Band leaders to accept Old Mission Peninsula in lieu 
of the east shore); Grand Traverse Band o/Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 198 F. Supp. at 
925 ("Although [the Turtle Creek Casino site is] 1.5 miles outside the 1836 
reservation, evidence suggests that the site was located within the contemplated 
reservation, which was not designated for four years after the treaty was signed."). 
The 1836 Treaty reserved 20,000 acres for the Band. See also, Treaty of Washington, 7 
Stat. 491, art. II (1836) ("[O]ne tract of twenty thousand acres to be located on the 
[east] shore of Grand Traverse bay .... "). 
210. The Grand Traverse Reservation established by the 1855 Treaty of Detroit 
includes Leelanau, Suttons Bay, Leland, Centerville, and Bingham townships in 
Leelanau County, Michigan, and parts of Milton Township in Antrim County, 
Michigan. See Treaty of Detroit, art. I, cl. 5, 11 Stat. 621, 621 (1855); see Leelanau 
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The Tribes also made concessions of a lesser character. The 
Tribes agreed to report casino winnings to the State in the same 
manner as they reported them to the federal government.211 Prior to 
the agreement, the Tribes had refused to provide this information, 
arguing that federal law preempted the taxation and the requirement 
for withholding and reporting. Also, the Tribes agreed to report 
earnings made by professional performers at the Indian casino.212 
4. Michigan Single Business Tax 
The Michigan Single Business Tax ("SBT") is the general 
business tax levied by the State of Michigan. "The tax is on what a 
business has added to the Michigan economr' not on what the 
business has derived from this state's economy.,,21 
Under the Agreement, businesses owned by Tribes, tribal 
members, or by other tribal businesses are exempt from the SBT.214 
The parties agreed that any combination of signatory Tribes, their 
members, and their wholly owned businesses might be exempt from 
this tax. The agreement area for the purposes of this tax would 
extend to the agreement areas of all the various signatory Tribes 
. I d' h' 215 mvo ve m a partners Ip. 
The extension of the agreement area for the purposes of the 
SBT exemption was intended by the State to be a benefit extended to 
the Tribes and its members. The State came in with the position that 
Tribes should not be able to create partnerships that cross agreement 
areas, but the Tribes objected. Ultimately, the State conceded the 
point. 
5. Other Tax Agreement Provisions 
a. Sovereign Immunity Waivers 
The Tribes agreed to a waiver of sovereign immunity in order to 
allow the State to enforce the dispute resolution provisions.216 
Transit Co. v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, No. 1:92-CV-
240, at 2 (W.D. Mich., Feb. I, 1994) ("Article I, clause fifth of the Treaty of 1855 
reserved to the Grand Traverse bands land in the vicinity of the Tribe's current 
reservation at Peshawbestown.") (on file with author). The Senate removed the 
northern tip of Leelanau Township from the reservation when it ratifIed the treaty in 
1856. See aL50 RatifIcation of Treaty of Detroit by Senate, 11 Stat. 621, art. I (1856). 
211. Agreement§ N(E)(2). 
212. Agreement § N(E) (3). 
213. Columbia Associates, L.P. v. Dep't. of Treasury, 649 N.W.2d 760, 766 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
214. Agreement § VII(C). 
215. Agreement § VII(A)(2) (defining "Expanded Agreement Area"). 
216. Agreement § I(G)(I). 
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Initially, the waiver was tailored to allow the State to sue in tribal 
court to force the Tribes into arbitration and to enforce the award, if 
any, in tribal court.217 If the tribal court does not compel arbitration 
or enforce the award within fourteen business days, then the State 
may seek redress in state courts.218 Critically, the waiver survives the 
termination of the Agreement.219 The state negotiators argued that, 
absent survival of the waiver, a Tribe might terminate the Agreement 
and keep money that it may owe to the State. The Grand Traverse 
Band Tribal Council refused to execute the Agreement, in part, 
because of the survival of the waiver. 
The second waiver regarded the certificates of exemption that 
the Tribes may choose to utilize. 220 Here, the State must give the 
Tribe ten business days to respond to its notice of intention to bring 
suit to enforce sales and use taxes owed through the use (or misuse) 
of the certificates of exemption.221 Importantly, the State may bring 
suit to enforce its rights under the certificates of exemption against 
the Tribe, even if a tribal member caused the injury to the State.222 
Again, the waiver survives the termination of the Agreement.223 
The State's waiver for purposes of enforcement derives from 
current law,224 a waiver through the Michigan Court of Claims. 
However, the State legislature may remove the waiver in future 
legislation,225 potentially leaving the Tribes with a distinct 
disadvantage in that event - the Tribes do not have a parallel 
provision in their waiver language. 
b. State Law as a Backdrop 
The State's position throughout negonatlOns was that any 
agreement with the Tribes on state tax exemptions would have to be 
treated as though state law was the backdrop. The Agreement states, 
II [e]xcept as modified in this Agreement, the provisions of State law 
relating to the taxes that are subject of this Agreement shall apply to 
the Tribe, Tribal Members, and Tribal Entities."226 The State wanted 
to treat the Agreement as an amendment to the current state tax 
laws. The state negotiators insisted that there could be no 
217. Agreement § J(G)(l)(b). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Agreement § 1 (G) (l)(c). 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Agreement § J(G) (2). 
225. [d. ("In the absence oj legislative modification, this waiver shall survive the 
termination of this Agreement. ") (emphasis added). 
226. Agreement § I(A) (2). 
HeinOnline -- 82 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 38 2004-2005
38 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 82:1 
Agreement otherwise; they wanted control over changes to the 
Agreement by limiting the ability of the Tribes to alter it unilaterally. 
The Tribes initially objected to this language and view of the 
Agreement. The Tribes wanted the Agreement to stand alone, as 
other agreements between the Treasury Department and a few other 
Tribes had done. Also, the Tribes worried that the provision would 
amount to an admission of state jurisdiction over Indian Country.227 
However, the built-in protections from state jurisdiction in other 
provisions in the Agreement satisfied most tribal attorneys. 
c. Enforcement Mechanisms and Jurisdiction 
The parties needed to provide for enforcement of the 
Agreement's provisions against tribal members, non-member Indians, 
and non-Indians, both on and off trust land, and within and outside 
Indian Country. Furthermore, the parties needed to provide for 
enforcement of the Agreement against two sovereign entities - the 
individual Tribes and the State. The State made it clear during 
negotiations that one of its main goals in coming to agreement with 
the Tribes was to enforce state law against non-Indians and against 
tribal members on trust land. Agreeing to state law enforcement over· 
persons in Indian Country - particularly on trust land - was a difficult 
step for many Tribes. The Tribes required the State to notify tribal 
law enforcement before engaging in enforcement actions in Indian 
Country as a compromise. As such, the enforcement mechanisms are 
the most extensive and complicated provisions in the agreement. 
i. Indian Country Concepts in the Agreement 
Though the Tribes and the State wished to dispense with the 
difficulty and vagueness of Indian Country for purposes of defining 
tax exemptions within the Agreement, it was still necessary to 
incorporate Indian Country into the Agreement for purposes of 
enforcing it.228 The agreement area concept served to adequately 
227. As is widely known by many Indian Law practitioners: 
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a 
definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a 
backdrap against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be 
read. It must always be remembered that the various Indian Tribes were 
once independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to 
sovereignty long predates that of our own Government. 
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (emphasis 
added). 
228. Agreement § XIII(D)(l) states: 
The parties recognize that (i) tax enforcement actions, and (ii) the process 
of audit, assessment and appeals of tax assessments, under this Agreement 
may be affected by jurisdictional issues where a Tribal Member or Tribal 
Entity or property is located within the Tribe's Indian Country. The parties 
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define boundaries for tax exemption purposes, but the State and the 
Tribes could not bind individual Indians to the agreement area in the 
event the State began criminal enforcement proceedings against 
tribal members. 
The Tribes successfully convinced the State that individual 
Indians would argue that the State has no enforcement authority over 
them in Indian Country,229 and that would quickly result in disputes 
over reservation boundaries. Since neither party wished for potential 
litigation in this regard, the State agreed to a compromise. In a case 
where the State attempts to enforce state law against a tribal member 
in an area where the State and Tribe dispute the existence of Indian 
Country, then the State may petition the tribal court for relief. 2so It 
was always a goal of the parties to avoid the Indian Country 
jurisdictional problems and the State's agreement to concede to 
tribal court jurisdiction for enforcement purposes in disputed 
territory was a gigantic leap forward for the Tribes. 
ii. Enforcing Against Tribal Members and Tribal Entities 
The enforcement provisions concerning tribal members and 
tribal entities are complicated. First, the State may audit tribal 
members and entities regarding the six taxes at issue in the 
agreement, but must provide thirty days written notice.2S) Second, 
under Michigan Court Rule 2.615, the State may petition the tribal 
court to grant recognition and enforcement of the state court order 
or judgment, and the tribal court must rule within fourteen days.2S2 
The State may also compel, through petition to the tribal court, the 
tribal member or entity to comply with an audit request or other tax 
enforcement action.2SS Upon the issuance of a tribal court order, the 
intend to avoid such effects by providing in certain instances identified in 
this Agreement for Tribal enforcement or joint Tribal/State enforcement. 
229. See People v. Bennett, 491 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) 
(discussing criminal defendant's argument that he was within Indian Country and 
therefore outside the jurisdiction of state courts); see also People v. Bowen, 1996 WL 
33357554, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1996) (holding that a non-enrolled Indian 
committing a crime in Indian Country was outside the scope of the state's criminal 
jurisdiction). But cf. United States v. Dakota, 666 F. Supp. 989, 994 (W.D. Mich. 
1985) ("The doctrine of Indian sovereignty protects the Indian Tribes from the 
assertion of state authority."); Huron Potawatomi, Inc. v. Stinger, 574 N.W.2d 706, 
709 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) ("However, state laws are generally not applicable to tribal 
Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has explicitly provided that 
state law shall apply.") (citing McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 
164 (1973». 
230. Agreement § XIII(D) (7). 
231. Agreement § XIII (D)(2) . 
232. Agreement§XIII(D)(4). 
233. Agreement § XIII (D) (6). 
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Tribe must provide tribal law enforcement, with the assistance of state 
fro· r£. thn£ ·234 o llcers, m pe ormmg e e orcement action. 
The Agreement allows the State to exercise its authority under 
state law to conduct prejudicial tax enforcement actions235 without 
first petitioning the tribal court for a search warrant.2S6 The 
Agreement provides that the State must give notice to tribal law 
enforcement before raiding a business or residence in Indian 
Country (or disputed Indian Countxy).2S7 The Tribe must provide 
tribal law enforcement officers to assist the state officers.2S8 Mter the 
enforcement action is undertaken, "the affected tribal member or 
entity must then affirmatively choose to ob~ect before the tribal court 
or else the case will be heard in state court. 39 
There are strict deadlines for tribal court actions within the 
Agreement. For example, upon a final tax assessment or denial of 
refund where the tribal court has jurisdiction, the tribal court must 
provide a ruling on appeal within one year.240 Also, if the State asks 
the tribal court for a search warrant related to a tribal member, tribal 
entity, or Tribe, then the court must decide within fourteen days to 
issue the warrant.241 Failure of the tribal court to meet timeframes 
allows the State to declare the Tribe out of compliance with the 
Agreement and invoke the dispute resolution provisions.242 The 
Tribes with separation of powers provisions in their constitutions243 
may have problems enforcing the strict deadlines against the tribal 
courts. However, tribal court judges will most likely understand the 
necessity of swift action and can take advantage of the opportunity to 
showcase the efficiency of their courts. 
234. [d. 
235. These enforcement actions are defined in Agreement § XIII (D) (9) (b) as 
actions in furtherance of a jeopardy assessment; inspection of vending machines or 
places where tobacco products are sold or stored; seizure of contraband consistent 
with the Tobacco Products Tax Act; and inspections or seizures consistent with this 
Agreement authorized under the Motor Fuel Tax Act or the Motor Carrier Fuel Tax 
Act. 
236. Agreement § XIII (D) (9) (a). 
237. [d. 
238. [d. 
239. Agreement § XIII (D) (10) (b). 
240. Agreement § XIII(D)(U). 
241. Agreement § XIII(D)(6). 
242. Agreement § XIV(B). 
243. See, e.g., GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CONST., Art. V, § 6, available at 
http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/GTBcons3.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2003); 
LITILE RIVER BAND CONST., Art. VI, § 9, available at 
http://thorpe.ou.edulconstitution/ottawa2.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2003). 
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iii. Enforcing Against the Tribe 
The State's enforcement authority over a signatory Tribe is 
greatly extended by the Agreement, but remains significantly limited. 
First, tribal officials may not be criminally prosecuted for violations of 
state law or the Agreement.244 Second, the State may conduct an 
audit of the Tribe in regards to an~ of the six taxes at issue, but must 
provide thirty days written notice. 45 Third, the State may not seize 
tribal assets in order to enforce a tax liability under the Agreement.246 
Fourth, the State may conduct unauthorized inspections of tribal 
facilities for the purpose of discovering only contraband, motor fuel 
or tobacco products,24? and may only seize those items that can be 
viewed in plain sight.248 Finally, the State must go to tribal court for a 
search warrant to search and seize items in tribal facilities.249 
iv. Enforcing Against Non-Tribal Members 
The parties agreed to allow the State to enter Indian Country 
and enforce state law against non-members provided that the State 
give notice of the enforcement action to tribal law enforcement.25o 
The purpose of this provision was to ensure that tribal law 
enforcement could accompany state officers and avoid conflict. 
Many non-members in Indian Country reside with tribal members 
and have come to expect that state officers have no jurisdiction over 
them, whether or not that expectation was reasonable. Although 
many Michigan Indian Tribes already have cross-deputization 
agreements with local law enforcement,251 the provision offers a 
safeguard. Other than the notice requirement, state law enforcement 
procedures would apply without amendment. 
d. Dispute Resolution 
The parties agreed to arbitration as the dispute resolution 
program. However, prior to arbitration, the complaining party must 
244. Agreemen t § XIII (C) (1) . 
245. Agreement § XIII(C) (2). 
246. Agreement § XIII(C) (3). 
247. Agreement § XIII (C)(4) (a). 
248. Agreement § XIII(C)(4)(b). 
249. Agreement § XIII(C) (4)(b)(i). 
250. Agreement § XIII(B). 
251. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Congress of American Indians et aL at 15-26 
(describing cross-deputization agreements involving the Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and the Little River Band of Odawa Indians and 
describing positive relationship between Michigan Tribes and local law 
enforcement), Inyo County, California v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop 
Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003). 
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submit a written statement of the dispute,252 and the responding party 
may file a written response within ten days.255 Based on these 
documents, the parties must meet and attempt to reach a 
resolution.254 If either party is dissatisfied, the parties may proceed to 
arbitration. 
If the parties elect to go to arbitration, each party names one 
arbitrator. The two arbitrators then agree on a third arbitrator.255 At 
that point, any sipnatory Tribe may choose to inteIVene as a party in 
the arbitration.25 The purpose of this provision was to assure the 
State that it would have to arbitrate a disputed provision in the 
Agreement only once. Because the determination of a disputed 
provision in the Agreement would be binding on every Tribe,25 each 
Tribe wanted the opportunity to make its argument and participate. 
The timetable for arbitration is very strict. The parties first submit 
comments on the issues to be arbitrated.258 Mter fourteen days, the 
panel decides which of those issues will be decided.259 At that point, a 
ninety day time period begins in which the parties may engage in 
discovery, provide written arguments, and provide oral arguments if 
requested by the panel. 260 The panel must resolve the issues within 
that same ninety day period.261 Whether it is possible to arbitrate 
complex issues created by the Agreement when the State and as many 
as seven Tribes are parties in arbitration, is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
e. Termination 
The Tribes strongly argued for a termination date as far off into 
the future as possible. The Tribes were concerned that a new state 
governor or administration would simply terminate the Agreement 
for political reasons. Former Michigan Governor John Engler did 
exactly that in the 1990s with a few Michigan Tribes. The State, on 
the other hand, argued that no termination date was needed. State 
negotiators relied on the rhetoric of a government-to-government 
relationship in order to convince the Tribes that the Agreement 
should be terminable without cause, at the will of the parties. Finally, 
252. Agreement § XIV(B) (I) (a)-(e). 
253. Agreement § XIV(B)(2). 
254. Agreement § XIV(B)(3). 
255. Agreement § XIV(C)(I). 
256. Agreement§XIV(C)(2). 
257. Agreement § XIV(C) (7). 
258. Agreement § XIV(C) (3). 
259. fd. 
260. fd. 
261. fd. 
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the State argued that an agreement that could be terminated only for 
cause would generate the potential for additional litigation. 
Ultimately, the State agreed to a two-year eeriod in which the 
Agreement could be terminated only for cause. 2 For terminations 
prior to the end of the two-year period, the Agreement provided for a 
list of reasons that would justify immediate termination263 and an 
arbitration provision to resolve any other termination matters.264 
Mter the two-year period, the Agreement could be terminated by 
either party for any reason or no reason at all.265 However, the parties 
agreed to a thirty-day "cooling off' period in which the State would 
meet with the Tribe to discuss its disputes or problems associated with 
the Agreement.266 
Upon the termination of the Agreement, the parties must 
enga$e in a final accounting of the amounts due to the other, if 
any.2 If the parties cannot agree, the Agreement provides for yet 
another arbitration.268 It is possible under the Agreement that a 
Tribe and the State could engage in three separate arbitrations over 
one dispute. 
j Most Favored Nation Clause 
A few Tribes lobbied for a "most favored nation" clause that 
would allow each signatory Tribe to re-open negotiations on the 
Agreement in the event another Tribe received a concession from 
the State. The State adamantly refused to accede to such a clause, 
arguing that it wanted each individual agreement to contain the same 
model language. Nevertheless, each signed agreement contains 
widely varying agreement areas depending on a particular Tribe's 
bargaining power and geographic position. For example, the Sault 
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, a Tribe with a lineal 
descendancy and massive numbers of enrolled members, a large land 
base, and incredible wealth,269 negotiated an agreement area that 
included nearly 10 townships, while the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of 
262. Agreement § XV(A). 
263. Agreement § XV(B)(I)(a)-(i). 
264. Agreement § XV(B)(3)-(4). 
265. Agreement § XV(A). 
266. Id. 
267. Agreement § XV(C) (1). 
268. Id. 
269. The Sault Tribe owns the Greektown Casino in Detroit, Michigan, which 
generates over a quarter billion dollars per year in revenues. See Becky Yerak, Detroit 
Casinos Post Their Second-Best Month: Extra day, promotions fuel gains, execs say, DET. 
NEWS, June 12, 2003, at lB. It also owns several smaller casinos in the Upper 
Peninsula of Michigan. See Becky Yerak, State Sees Slow Growth in Indian Casinos: Report 
Cities Fewer New Games, Facilities, DET. NEws,June I, 2003, at IB. 
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Potawatomi Indians, a recently-recognized Tribe270 with a smaller 
enrollment, much smaller land base, and no casino revenues, could 
negotiate for only two-and-a-half townships. 
CONCLUSION 
The major advances made by the Michigan Indian Tribes in the 
tax agreement negotiations with the State include tribal court 
jurisdiction, acknowledgment of Indian Country by the State, and the 
preservation of certain big-ticket tax exemptions on trust land. The 
major concessions made by the Tribes include a waiver of immunity 
with no end date, encroachment of state criminal and civil 
enforcement jurisdiction on trust land, and agreement that the State 
could impose its taxes on some parcels of trust land. 
Importantly, both the State and the Tribes avoided litigation 
over reservation boundaries and the extent of Indian Country in 
Michigan, while staying out of federal courts entirely. Litigation for 
purposes of enforcement of the Agreement will start in tribal courts 
in most instances, an important acknowledgement by the State of the 
validity of tribal courts. Arbitration as the form of dispute resolution 
between the State and the Tribes allows the Tribes to avoid state 
courts, except for purposes of enforcing the arbitration awards. 
The certainty that comes with the Tax Agreement allows the 
Tribes to plan for the future in terms of business plans, project 
financing, and the provision of government services to tribal 
members. The Tribes may acquire significant additional sales tax 
revenue through the revenue sharing provisions and save money 
through the State's recognition of several tax exemptions. Tribal 
members will be granted some limited tax exemptions to assist their 
own small businesses and will enjoy the benefit of paying less state 
income and sales taxes. For many unemployed, undereducated, and 
elderly tribal members who earn little or no income, a few hundred 
dollars saved is substantial. 
The Tax Agreement's revenue sharing provisions may also 
encourage the signatory Tribes and the State to cooperate 
economically. Since the State agreed to share a portion of the sales 
and use taxes regardless of where the value of the products sold was 
generated, it is possible that Tribes will pursue business activity to 
create reservation-based value,271 or even off-reservation-based value, 
in which the Tribes and the State will share tax revenues. 
270. The Bureau of Indian Affairs recognized the Nottawaseppi Band of 
Potawatomi Indians in 1995. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of 
the Huron Potawatomi, Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 66.315 (Dec. 21,1995). 
271. See Dep't. of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 
72 (1994); Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
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Assuming the cooperation between the State and the Tribes 
regarding enforcement goes well, the Agreement may have other 
advantages. Hopefully, the Tax Agreement will encourage the Tribes 
and the local governments to enter into cooperation agreements as 
to law enforcement, zoning, environmental regulation, and other 
areas of civil and criminal regulation and enforcement. 
Both the State of Michigan and the Michigan Indian Tribes had 
their own agendas when they negotiated the Tax Agreement. 
Underlying every detail about tax enforcement, administration, and 
exemption was the sincere desire to avoid a situation where one 
sovereign's property is seized because another sovereign labels that 
property contraband, a situation that many Michigan Tribes have 
faced, a situation that caused the terrible fracas at Narragansett. 
At one time in the history of relations between the State of 
Michigan and the Tribes, the State's local governl'lents attempted to 
use their power to tax as a means of destruction. On the Little 
Traverse Bay Bands Reservation in the mid-nineteenth century, an 
Emmett County official summed up the policy of the local 
government when he said that the tax rate for Indian land would be 
raised until the area had "relieved itself of the presence of Indians. ,,272 
Fortunately, those attitudes have been driven underground and are 
no longer expressed as controlling policy. 
Now, Michigan Indian Tribes are stronger political players, often 
the largest employer in their regions, and contribute millions in 
revenue every year to local governments in accordance with their 
gaming compacts.273 Michigan Tribes are an important economic 
engine, given their mandate to construct housing, health clinics, and 
public safety and administration buildings. Michigan Tribes' 
economic development initiatives, from resorts and casinos to gas 
stations and light manufacturing, are an important part of the State's 
134, 156-57 (1980) ("While the Tribes do have an interest in raising revenues for 
essential governmental programs, that interest is strongest when the revenues are 
derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and 
when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services."). But cJ. Prairie Band 
Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1309 (D. !\an. 2003), reu'd 379 
F.3d 979 (10'" Cir. 2004) ("While the Tribe certainly has an interest in raising 
revenues, that interest is at its weakest when goods are imported from off-reservation 
for sale to non-Indians."). 
272. Bruce A. Rubenstein, Justice Denied: An Analysis of American Indian-White 
Relations in Michigan, 1855-1889 (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan 
State University) (on file with Author). 
273. See, e.g., Gaming Revenue to Benefit 53 Causes, TRAVERSE CITY (MICH.) RECORD-
EAGLE, Feb. 6, 2003 ("The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
will distribute more than $1.1 million to area schools, governments and other 
organizations as part of its semiannual grant awards reflecting 2 percent of its 
electronic gaming revenue."), available at http://www.record-
eagle.com/2003/feb/06Tribe.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2003). 
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recovery from the national recession. In many ways, non-Indian 
communities located near Indian communities have become 
dependent, economiCally and politically, on the local Tribes. 
The State ,of Michigan recognized the importance of Michigan 
Tribes when it negotiated the Tax Agreement. The State realized the 
benefits of this cooperation. No Michigan Indian Tribe wants what 
happened at Narragansett to happen on their reservations. As Jim 
Harrison wrote: 
It is easy enough to forget that a nation has a soul history, 
and that a nation's honor depends on its capacity to right 
the wrongs it has committed. As an instance it was popular 
for decades to speak about the treaties Russia had broken, 
when it was difficult indeed to find a single treaty among 
thousands that our government had kept with our Native 
Americans. If the government fails to protect its minorities 
how does it differ in quality from so many foredoomed 
totalitarian states. We must give up the notion, over and 
over, that the government is trustworthy, right down to the 
local level, without the relentless vigilance of its citizens.274 
The Tax Agreement is, in many ways, a new treaty, one between 
the Tribes and the State, and should be honored as such. The 
blueprint, as complicated, troubling, and hopeful as one would 
expect when so many sovereigns, bureaucrats, and lawyers are 
involved, is there, ready to be followed. Other agreements - zoning, 
environmental protection, public safety cooperation, and so on -
should follow. The time for destruction is over. 
M · h 275 19wetc . 
274. Jim Harrison, Introduction, GEORGE WEEKS, MEM-KAE-WEH: DAWNING OF THE 
GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWAINDlANS ix, ix-x (1992). 
275. "Thank you." See FREDERIC BARAGA, A DICTIONARY OF THE OJIBWAY LANGUAGE 
258 (1878) (Minn. Historical Society Press 1992). 
